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THE INFLUENCE OF REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS ON TRADE FLOWS 
– THE REVIEW OF BIC - COUNTRIES 
 
The target in this thesis is to study the influence of the regional trade agreements of the BIC-
countries (Brazil, India and China) on trade flows by using a gravity model. In this thesis it is 
investigated how much BIC-countries’ regional trade agreements explain of the bilateral trade 
flows during the time period 2001-2008 and whether there is trade diversion. In addition, the 
characteristics of the countries influencing on trade creation and diversion are studied.  
In the empirical part the gravity model is used. Normally, the gravity model is used to explain 
the variation in the country pairs’ trade flows and the influence of regional trade agreements 
on possible trade creation and diversion. The influence of regional trade agreements on trade 
is estimated by using the OLS and Instrumental Variable (IV) estimations. Four cultural 
variables were chosen to be instruments for a regional trade agreement variable. 
The estimation results indicate that the bilateral trade flows in the BIC-countries increased 
76 % during the time period 2001-2008. In addition to trade creation, a large trade diversion 
was found. The post-estimation tests revealed that the OLS-model gives more reliable results 
than IV-method when the language was included in cultural instruments. Opposite results 
were achieved when language was excluded from the instruments. From eight country 
characteristics that were studied distance, common border and common continent had a 
positive impact on the trade creation, but negative impact on trade diversion. The impacts of 
cultural variables on trade creation and diversion were mostly in line with the theory of 
natural trading partners. 
 
Keywords: international trade, integration, regional trade area, emerging countries, gravity 
model, instrumental variable –estimation.  
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Definition of Essential Concepts 
Regional Trade Agreement (RTA) 
Regional  Trade  Agreement  is  a  trade  agreement  between  two  or  more  countries  and  is  one  
form of economic co-operation and integration. In RTA, only the trade barriers of the member 
countries are reduced. Therefore, it is discriminatory. The countries that belong to the same 
regional trade area do not have to be geographically close. (Sawyer & Sprinkle 2004, 205.) 
World  Trade  Organization  (WTO  a)  uses  the  term  RTA  when  discussing  regional  trade  
agreements  in  general.  In  this  thesis,  I  will  use  the  term  RTA  as  the  main  concept  when  
discussing trade agreements of any kind mentioned below in general even though the 
countries would be geographically distant. 
 
Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) 
The loosest version of the regional trade agreement is Preferential Trade Agreement, which is 
commonly an agreement between at least two countries. In PTA, the tariffs have not been 
removed. Instead, the tariffs have been lowered on goods produced in the member countries. 
(Panagariya 2000, 288.) Preferential trade agreement is the first stage of economic integration, 
which usually leads to free trade agreement. 
 
Free Trade Area (FTA) 
In the free trade area, all the tariffs are removed between the member countries. However, the 
countries have their own external trade policies meaning that they still have their own tariffs 
to non-FTA countries. (Freund & Ornelas 2010, 141; Urata & Okabe 2007, 2.) 
 
Custom Union (CU) 
The countries that belong to the same CU, which is a form of RTA, remove the trade barriers 
between the members and have the same external tariff structure (Urata & Okabe 2007, 2). 
Within the CU, the good can move tariff free (Freund & Ornelas 2010, 141). 
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1Introduction 
 
1.1 Background and motivation 
 
When discussing the regional trade agreements, the focus often is, what kind of influence the 
establishment of the regional trade agreements has on the member countries. Usually the 
interest is in modeling and predicting foreign trade flows, which has been an important 
subject in international economics. The influence of trade liberalization on trade has been 
researched from the viewpoint of developing and developed countries. However, there is lack 
of information, how the trade of emerging countries reacts on trade liberalization. Not many 
researchers have concentrated on emerging countries, like BIC-countries (Brazil, India and 
China), as a group so far. Though, some studies about the trade liberalization of single 
emerging countries have been made. In most of the research, the regional trade agreements 
have influenced positively on trade flows. Mainly these researches have concentrated on the 
largest and most known regional trade agreements such as EU, Mercosur and Nafta and 
general regional trade agreement effect. 
There are reasons why more research has been done about the largest regional trade areas 
instead of regional trade agreements to which emerging countries belong to. On the one hand 
the reason for this has been the protectionist measures that the emerging countries that are still 
categorized into developing countries use to protect their domestic industries. On the other 
hand the non-membership of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The aim in this thesis is 
to study in the literature review and empirical part the influence of the regional trade 
agreements on trade and welfare and discuss possible trade creation and diversion effects. In 
the empirical part, the analysis is done by using emerging country group BIC (Brazil, India 
and China) and their trading partners as a review group. 
The emerging country group, BIC, is chosen to be the target because recent years these 
countries have received attention the most among emerging countries. As a country group 
BIC is interesting to study, because of the increasing power the countries have in the world 
economy as well as in the politics, due to China’s becoming the second largest economy in 
the world in August 2010 based on the second-quarter GDP (China overtakes Japan-- 2010). 
Above all, the large share of their GDPs and exports in the world total has increased the 
influence of the economies in the world economy. Their GDPs represent 13.5 % of the world 
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GDP and exports 11 % of the total world exports (The World Bank b, 28.1.2011).1 For these 
reasons the investment bank Goldman Sachs gave the name BRIC-countries to these 
economies including Russia in the report in 2003. However, by comparing countries with 
their GDP per capita, all these countries are still categorized as developing countries or 
emerging countries2 (IMF 2010, 2.) 
The influence of regional trade agreements can be modeled with various trade liberalization 
theories that underline the role of the government in the decision making. With the gravity 
model framework it is tried to find out in the empirical part, whether the influence of regional 
trade agreements on trade in a case of BIC-countries is in line with the theories, and what is 
the  trade  effect  of  the  regional  trade  agreements.  It  is  important  to  make  clear  that  BICs  as  
such are not a regional trade area.3 
There are many reasons to think over, why the increasing number of emerging country group 
BIC’s regional trade agreements, is significant. First of all, the establishment of regional trade 
areas has been significant for the world economy because the globalization has developed via 
trade integration. Second, by studying this, it is possible to find out what kind of influence the 
trade liberalization has had on this fast growing country group’s trade and especially exports. 
In general, developing countries are known in their export-led growth strategies. According to 
the export-led growth theory, the increase in exports as a consequence of regional trade 
agreements may have played an important role in the growth of the countries. This is because 
the domestic industries have boosted the productivity to meet the demand for the increased 
exports. (Crawford & Fiorentino 2005, 2.) Third, if it is known how much regional trade 
agreements have influenced on BIC’s export growth and other possible factors that have 
influenced on trade flows, it is easier to analyze and predict the effects of trade policies. 
Especially, in the interest here is the growing importance of the BIC-countries in the world 
economy. 
                                               
1Author’s calculations are based on the World Bank data. Data are in current U.S. dollars for GDP and exports. 
2 World Bank categorizes Brazil, China and India developing countries. In the categorization of the World Bank 
Atlas method, which is another way to make a difference between the relative size of economies in terms of 
gross national income. In addition the World Bank Atlas method is used to classify countries in low, middle and 
high-income categories and to set lending eligibilities. In this categorization India and China belongs to lower 
middle income and Brazil into upper middle income. (The World Bank a, 14.05.2011) 
3 BIC-countries (Brazil, India and China) as such are not a regional trade area. Actually, all of them are not 
members in any certain regional trade area. (WTO c) 
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In addition to the influence on exports, the trade liberalization may have significant influence 
on BIC-countries and the rest of the world to survive from the recent financial crisis. In the 
recent discussion about the regionalism the subject under review has been, whether we should 
carry on regionalism or try to slow it down. Especially during the financial crisis 2008-2009, 
under  the  discussion  was  that  which  one  is  better  for  countries  to  survive  from  the  crisis  -  
protectionism or trade liberalization? Liberalization of trade was the answer according to 
Freytag and Voll (2009) in their research based policy analysis. Freytag and Voll (2009) 
underlined the importance of emerging countries in this after crisis liberalization and re-
regulation process. The efforts to avoid protectionism could help the BRICs and the rest of the 
world to survive from the recent financial crisis. (OECD 2009, 1.) Even though the 
globalization through the trade integration has already come a long way, there is still need for 
it, which supports the importance of the trade liberalization as a topic. Therefore the role of 
the emerging countries in the trade liberalization should be reviewed. 
 
1.2 Research problem, method and main results 
 
The aim in the thesis is to study the influence of the regional trade agreements on trade flows 
by using a gravity model. Specifically, the goal is to find out how much the regional trade 
agreements of the BIC-countries explain of the bilateral trade flows during the period 2001-
2008 and whether there is trade diversion. In addition, the country characteristics influencing 
on trade creation and diversion are studied. The results are also compared with the previous 
studies and considered whether the results are in line with the previous research. Differently 
from previous studies an emerging country group is the target group. I extend the previous 
studies by concentrating only on emerging countries and their trade flows and trying to 
minimize the bias by instrumenting the RTA variable. 
The model that is used in the empirical part is the gravity model, which is used to explain the 
variation in the country pairs’ trade flows and the influence of regional trade agreements on 
possible trade creation and diversion. In addition to an OLS-estimation, I also use an 
econometric method, the Instrumental Variable estimation (IV). Commonly problems such as 
endogeneity, omitted variables and measurement errors appear in the linear regression for 
different reasons. Anyhow, at least the endogeneity problem can be solved by using 
instrumental variable estimation. (Baum 2006, 185.) In addition, IV-estimation enables me to 
9 
 
avoid the biased and inconsistent estimates that may occur with panel data on the standard 
OLS-estimation. Most of the studies that have previously estimated the gravity model use the 
ordinary least square (OLS) method to cross section data or other than IV-estimation. 
My estimation results indicate that the bilateral trade flows in the BIC-countries increased 
76 % during the time period 2001-2008 when the model was estimated with the OLS-model. 
OLS-model turned out to give more reliable results than IV-method when language variable 
was included in cultural instruments. Opposite results were achieved when language was 
excluded from the instruments. In addition, a large trade diversion was found. From eight 
characteristics that were studied distance, common border and common continent had a 
positive impact on the trade creation and opposite negative impact on trade diversion in the 
case of BIC-countries. In addition, the impacts of cultural variables on trade creation and 
diversion were mostly in line with the theory of natural trading partners. 
 
1.3 Limitations of the Study 
 
There are some limitations in my study. In the empirical part, I study only the regional trade 
agreements  of  the  emerging  countries.  From  the  emerging  country  group  BRICs,  I  will  
concentrate on Brazil, India and China. Because Russia is not a member of WTO, it is 
excluded from the study. In this way, the emerging country group under review becomes 
more homogenous. According to the WTO’s definition, the regional trade agreements include 
both free trade areas and custom unions. Also preferential trading agreements (PTA) are 
included in the study, because they develop to be regional trade agreements at a later date and 
WTO categorizes preferential trade agreement to be one form of the regional trade 
agreements. In addition, I limit the data period to end before the latest financial crisis, because 
only China among some other countries was growing during that exceptional time. The world 
total growth was actually diminishing (The World Bank b, 28.1.2011).4 Therefore we may 
avoid some bias in the data. I concentrate only on discriminatory tariff reduction meaning that 
I exclude the multilateral liberalization from my study. In addition, I will not pay too much 
attention to Common Market and Economic Union as forms of trade integration. 
                                               
4 According to the World Bank Development Indicators, the annual percentage growth rate of GDP of the world 
was -1.95% in 2009. The annual percentage growth rate of GDP is calculated at market prices based on constant 
local currency by author. 
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1.4 Structure of the Study 
 
The structure of the study is following. In the first chapter, introduction, the research problem 
and the motivation for the study are described. The second chapter consists of explanation of 
the  development  of  trade  liberalization  and  the  recent  trends.  In  the  third  chapter,  it  is  
discussed, how tariff reduction affects the member countries in terms of trade and welfare and 
the possible consequences on non-member countries are discussed. Also it is discussed the 
characteristics of the countries that make regional trade agreements more trade creating or 
diverting. Chapter 4 is the review of the empirical literature. First, it is discussed the general 
empirical studies about the trade liberalization and then the focus is moved to the studies of 
the emerging economies. In the fifth chapter, the gravity model framework that is used in the 
empirical part is explained in detail. Also the instrumental variable -methodology is gone 
through. Chapter 6 concentrates on describing the data and possible limitations to the 
empirical  part.  The results of the empirical  part  are represented in Chapter 7.  Therefore,  the 
study is concluded in Chapter 8 and possible ideas for the future research represented.  
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2 Trade Liberalization 
 
In this chapter, I will discuss trade liberalization more deeply and consider how the regional 
trade agreements have developed during the years. This chapter, as the thesis, concentrates on 
discriminatory tariff reduction. First, I will present the features of the trade liberalization to be 
able to understand the context of this thesis. 
 
2.1 Description  
 
Economic co-operation and integration have a long history. Formal and informal trade 
agreements have existed wherever people have traded. (Plant & Taghian 2008, 1.) In the half 
–century before World War I some countries already enjoyed free trade in Europe. Though, 
this system of free trade did not emerge from any continent-wide agreement. Instead, mainly 
the series of bilateral treaties were established. (De Melo & Panagariya 1996, 122.) Later 
broader trade liberalization began when the European integration started to develop in the 
1950 in the form of European Economic Community (EEC) that nowadays is known as 
European Union. (Berry & Hargreaves 2007, 1-8.) The European integration led through 
contagion and imitation effects on the trade liberalization continue steadily. (Pomfret 2007, 
924.) Since the early 1990s regional trade integration has been the main form of trade 
liberalization. (Calvo-Pardo, Freund & Ornelas 2009, 2). These days, the most known 
regional trade agreements are EU (European Union), NAFTA (North American Free Trade 
Agreement), MERCOSUR (Southern Common Market), ASEAN (The Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations) and COMESA (The Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa) (WTO a, 30.1.2011). 
Trade liberalization is a form of trade policy. In the trade liberalization, the countries that 
have opened their trade to international trade remove both tariff barriers and non-tariff 
barriers to trade. The trade liberalization increases by the formation of new trade areas or by 
the expansion of the existing trade areas.  
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In the trade liberalization, the agreement can be (Crawford & Fiorentino 2005, 4): 
i) Between two countries (bilateral) 
ii) Between a country and already existing regional trade area (bilateral) or 
iii) Between many countries (plurilateral).  
The trade liberalization is implemented through regional trade agreements and the aim is to 
remove both tariffs and non-tariff barriers (import quotas, export restraints, and export 
subsidies) to trade. A tariff is a tax on either imported or exported good. The effect of import 
tax is symmetrical to the effect of export tax. (Sawyer & Sprinkle 2004, 132-133.) A tariff is 
the oldest form of trade policy and traditionally it has been a source of government income, 
even though the main purpose has usually been to protect domestic industries (Krugman & 
Obstfeld, 2009, 183). There are different types of tariffs as specific tariffs, ad valorem tariffs 
and compound tariffs (Sawyer & Sprinkle 2004, 132-133). The importance of tariffs has 
decreased recently and governments prefer to protect domestic industries through a variety of 
nontariff barriers (Krugman & Obstfeld 2009, 183). The reasons to establish regional trade 
agreements and the benefits of forming RTA have been defined mostly by economic terms 
that will be gone through in Chapter 3. (Plant & Taghian 2008, 1.) 
 
2.2 The Levels of Integration 
 
There are different levels of integration. Economic integration can apply to only product 
markets as well as the integration can be deepened to the markets of production (labor and 
capital) and services as it is done in the custom union such as European Union where there is 
a free move of goods, services, labor and capital (Berry & Hargreaves 2007, 4-5). When the 
first trade liberalization, the establishment of ECC, took place, only tariffs and quotas were 
removed. This was the lowest level of integration. The ECC is the origin of European Union. 
(Berry & Hargreaves 2007, 6.)  
When discussing the trading blocs, the main concept is regional trading agreements (RTA). In 
the literature terms preferential trade area (PTA), free trade area (FTA) and custom union 
(CU) are often used. Both Free Trade Area (FTA) and Custom Union (CU) are forms of 
regional trade agreements. From the regional trade agreements, approximately 90 % are free 
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trade areas and 10 % are custom unions. (WTO a, 30.1.2011.) From Figure 1 below the levels 
and typical characteristics of economic integration can be observed for different levels of 
economic integration. 
Figure 1: Levels of Economic Integration (Sawyer & Sprinkle 2004, 207) 
 
The differences between the levels of economic integration can be noted in the vertical axis 
from Figure 1 above. In the horizontal axis, there are the different levels of economic 
integration. The economic union is the deepest form of economic integration when the 
preferential trade agreement is the loosest. The economic union includes all the looser forms 
of economic integration. European Union is an excellent example of the economic union. In 
preferential trade agreement only some tariffs are removed, but in custom union all the 
intragroup tariffs are removed and countries in the bloc set a common external tariff. (Sawyer 
& Sprinkle 2004, 207.) Therefore, depending on the level of economic integration, different 
characteristics are typical for the agreement. This thesis concentrates in both literature review 
and empirical part only the three least restrictive levels of economic integration known as 
PTAs, FTAs and CUs. 
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2.3 The Development of the Regional Trade Liberalization 
 
One of the main international developments in recent years has been the growth of regional 
trade agreements (RTA). WTO announced there were overall 2835 regional trade agreements 
that include either or both goods and services, in force and 191 under negotiation in July 2010 
(WTO a, 30.1.2011). As Figure 2 below depicts, the number of RTAs has increased 
constantly. It is interesting to perceive that the world trade has grown in the same pace. The 
figure is based on the agreements that can include either goods or both goods and services and 
are in force according to WTO.  
Figure 2: The Development of the World Trade and Regional Trade Agreements (WTO d, 
21.9.2010) 
It can be noted from the above Figure 2 that there have been three peaks in the development 
of the regional trade areas that are gone through in the following paragraphs. The trade 
liberalization expanded to developing countries in the 1970s when the Generalised System of 
Preferences (GSTP) was established in 1971. Therefore, the extensions of tariff preferences 
for developing countries become possible. (Pomfret 2007, 924.) Since 1970 the amount of 
RTAs has been on the increase. 
                                               
5 This list includes either or both goods and services. Divergences in RTA numbers are due to different methods 
used to count agreements. A complete list of RTAs notified by the GATT or WTO is in the webpage: 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm. 
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Therefore, the first peak of agreements was before the 1980s. (OECD 2009, 2.) In the 90s, the 
amount of agreements again started to rise remarkably (2nd peak). This trade integration has 
increased the globalization in terms of trade integration meaning that more and more 
countries belong to at least one trading bloc. In addition to that, countries have reached 
bilateral agreements. However, skepticism about trade liberalization came in the picture late 
1990s and some signals of decreasing trade liberalization were noticed. (OECD 2009, 4.) 
Still, the growth of regional trade agreements and world trade has always correlated strongly. 
In the early 2000s, the trade liberalization in Asia can be seen as a third wave of agreements 
(Pomfret 2007, 925). In East Asia, the regional integration started to increase in the year of 
1985. The integration was more market driven than policy driven. (Pomfret 2007, 936.) 
Despite the ASEAN free trade area (AFTA) there were not many significant bilateral or 
plurilateral agreements before to 2000. However, in Asia, there are currently at least dozen 
major free trade areas. 
Significant changes were noticed when the trade liberalization took place in Asia. For 
instance, the countries started to establish more bilateral agreements compared to plurilateral. 
Besides, the bilateral agreements were no more formed with countries in the same 
geographical area which is the reason for the decrease of regionalism. (Plummer 2007, 1772.) 
China, for example established regional trade agreement with Peru and India with Chile. 
Despite the crisis in the 2008-2009, the trend of the increasing regional trade agreements 
continued. As Figure 2 above represented, the trend in the world trade has followed the trend 
in regional trade agreements. Except during the financial crisis while the world trade in total 
was decreasing.  
 
2.4 The Trade Liberalization of the BIC-countries 
 
In  addition  to  Asia’s  trade  liberalization,  also  other  significant  changes  were  noticed  in  the  
integration during past two decades. Since the 1980s the emerging economies Brazil, China 
and India among other six of the largest non-OECD-countries, BRIICS (Brazil, Russia, India, 
Indonesia, China and South Africa), started to integrate rapidly to the world markets. The 
integration of these countries became an important component of globalization. These 
countries reduced trade barriers in the borders remarkably. For example, they reduced the 
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average applied tariffs on non-agricultural products, even though the pace varied across the 
countries. (OECD 2009, 2.) 
From the emerging economies, especially all of the BICs have liberalized their trade 
significantly in recent decades. Brazil was the first of BIC-countries that started to reduce its 
protection. This took part in the late 1980s and mid-1990 during the second wave of trade 
liberalization when protection was also globally reduced significantly as it is possible see 
from Figure 2 in Chapter 2.3. Instead, China still had in the 1990s relatively high import 
tariffs even though certain specially designated economic zones in China had already enjoyed 
more liberal regimes since the late 1970s. Thus, the tariffs in China were more than halved at 
the beginning of the 1990s. The reduction continued in 2001 when China became a member 
of WTO. From BIC-countries, India had the highest tariffs among BICs in the late 1980s. 
Therefore, the country implemented significant tariff cuts in the 1990s and 2000s6. 
According to the analysis of OECD, the countries and sectors that have opened the most, have 
also enjoyed the largest growth meaning that the liberalization of trade influences the growth.7 
China, for example and its openness to foreign direct investments in the manufacturing sector 
has had positive effect  on trade and growth. (OECD 2009, 3.)  The BICs have become more 
integrated with world intermediate inputs, final goods and service markets, which can be seen 
as a result in their increased share of the world trade. 
 
2.5 The Recent Trends 
 
As it has already been discussed the trade liberalization in Asia and emerging economies 
brought significant changes to the trade liberalization. Around the year 2005, four trends 
                                               
6 However, there has been debate about the timing of India’s trade liberalization. Actually, India cut the tariffs of 
capital and intermediate goods already in the 1980s, which was a decade before the consumer goods that were 
effectively banned. Actually, it was not until 2001 that all consumer goods’ imports were liberalized. This early 
liberalization of capital and intermediate goods has had significant influences on India according to some 
researchers. This may be because the capital account liberalization should normally follow, not precede, the 
liberalization of trade, because the large inflows of capital that generally follow the freeing of the capital account 
could cause a large appreciation of the real exchange rate, leading to large import surges that destabilize 
domestic industries and the balance of payments. (Zagha & Nankani. 2005, 142) 
7 Rodrigues and Rodrik (2001) started the discussion about this causal relationship and they found mixing 
results. However, Greenway, Morgan and Wright (2002, 229) found that trade liberalization has a positive 
impact on growth, albeit with a lag. In addition, Sala-i-Martin  (2007, 7-10) found out that the economic 
integration has positive influence on growth. Sala-i-Martin (2007, 7-10) lists various channels through which 
integration can affect the overall growth rate, e.g. increased specialization and the effect of trade liberalization on 
institutions, policies and the political process itself. 
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related to regional trade agreements were noticed (Crawford & Fiorentino 2005, 2). First, 
countries started to make regional trade agreements the centerpiece of their commercial 
policy. Second, the complexity of regional trade agreements started to increase because of the 
increased amount of agreements, both bilateral and plurilateral. Third, reciprocal preferential 
trade agreements between developed and developing countries began to increase. Also the 
agreements between key developing countries started to increase which meant that the so 
called South-South trading patterns began strengthening. Fourth, the number of cross-regional 
regional trade agreements started enhancing, but also the regional trading areas on a continent 
wide  were  on  the  rise.  (Crawford  &  Fiorentino  2005,  2).  Some  of  these  trends  and  the  
underlying reasons can be noticed also in practice. 
The signs of more diverse and complex RTAs can be noticed in the configuration of the 
agreements. The overlapping agreements and networks of regional trade areas have been 
reaching within and across continents at the regional and subregional levels. In addition, 
compared with plurilateral agreements more bilateral agreements are nowadays established. 
This change can be seen especially in the agreements of India and China (WTO b, 12.8.2011). 
The complexity of the RTAs originates in the intersecting agreements. Both China and India, 
for instance are at the center of systems of bilateral RTAs. In addition to SAFTA membership 
India has for instance bilateral regional trade agreements with Nepal, Bhutan and Afghanistan 
and India has signed regional trade agreements with Japan and EFTA, for instance (WTO b, 
12.8.2011). This kind of system of arrangements that India and China have, is known as “hub 
and spoke” RTA, where India and China are the hub nations and the partner countries in the 
bilateral agreements are spoke nations as it can be seen from Figure 3 below.  
 
Figure 3: Hub and Spoke Regional Trade Agreements (Baldwin & Venables 1995, 1636) 
India
Bhutan
AfghanistanNepal
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In general, the role of the increased amount of bilateral agreements is a significant trend 
because of the trade effects of the “hub and spoke” –system. Researchers have suggested that 
the  benefits  of  the  hub  nations  are  greater  than  the  benefits  of  the  spoke  nation.  This  is  
because  a  hub  country,  India,  forms  a  hub  and  spoke  system with  Afghanistan  and  Bhutan.  
This may lead to trade diversion for spoke countries Afghanistan and Bhutan, but not for hub 
country India. If the model is extended to include more spoke countries such as Nepal, each 
new spoke country leads more trade creation for the hub, India. However, the welfare 
implications for existing spoke countries depend upon whether the exports of the new spoke, 
Nepal, are complements or substitutes to those of old members, Afghanistan and Bhutan. If 
they are substitutes, the old spoke nations can be harmed by erosion of their degree of 
preference in the system. In a case of complements, the initial member countries also tend to 
gain. (Baldwin & Venables 1995, 1634-1635.) These kind of hub and spoke arrangements 
have increased the complexity in the system and as well have changed some typical 
characteristics of the trading partners such as geographical distance. 
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3 The Economic Impacts of Trade Liberalization 
 
The goal of this thesis is to study in the empirical part the trade effects of the regional trade 
agreements by using data from the emerging economies. Within the researchers, there is 
significant disagreement about the consequences of the trade liberalization (Ornelas 2005b, 
472). Viner was the first researcher who presented his theory on general trade effects dividing 
the effects into two: trade creation and diversion in the traditional, static welfare analysis “The 
Custom Union Issue”. After Viner trade creation has been represented by many researchers as 
well as the overall positive effects of the regional trade agreements have been questioned. 
(See Bhagwati, Krishna, & Panagariya 1999, 105-118.) 
In general, as Viner (See Bhagwati, Krishna, & Panagariya 1999, 105-118) discovered, both 
trade creation and diversion are possible consequences of the trade liberalization. Therefore in 
this chapter both of them are carefully gone through. The main goal is to consider the effects 
of the trade liberalization on the trade of the member countries. The factors that are taken into 
the consideration when establishing the agreement operate a base of the analysis. In addition, 
at the end of this chapter, in Chapter 3.3, I talk through the relationship between 
nondiscriminatory and discriminatory tariff reduction. This causal relationship functions as a 
base for the influences of RTA on trade flows and is also one of the consequences of the trade 
liberalization in the model of Ornelas. In addition, the influence of partner country 
characteristics on trade creation and diversion is reviewed, because some of the researchers 
suggest that these may have influence on what kind of trade effects the established RTA may 
have. 
 
3.1 Trade Creation 
 
In the trade creation, a low-cost RTA member country replaces the high-cost domestic 
producers and each country produces a good to which they have comparative advantage 
(Yamarik & Ghosh 2004, 370). It is a creation of trade that would have not happened if the 
tariff had not fallen. Trade creation always increases both the world and national welfare. 
(Sawyer & Sprinkle 2004, 211.) 
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Viner’s custom union theory that examines trade creation is based on perfect competition in 
commodity and factor markets in a partial equilibrium framework. He examines the effects on 
both small and large countries. In the model, the tariff reduction increases the trade between 
the members of the union and the trade flows between members and non-members stay 
unchanged  if  the  union  is  trade  creating.  Therefore,  the  welfare  of  the  members  and  of  the  
world increases. (See Bhagwati, Krishna, & Panagariya 1999, 105-118.) Viner’s theory 
explains the trade effects well in a perfect competition. However, the model does not take into 
the consideration the role of the government in the decision making or other factors that may 
influence the end result in the imperfect competition framework. 
Differently, Emanuel Ornelas (2005b, 475) developed a model that explains the general trade 
effects of the regional trade agreements in an imperfect competition framework. The main 
idea in his theory is based on the influence of special interest groups on government decision 
making, which is essential part in the theory as governments are the ones who decide whether 
to join RTA. Ornelas (2005b, 473) uses the distributive and strategic effects to describe the 
relationship between internal and external tariffs. The positive relationship between internal 
and external tariffs leads to trade creation within the members and between members and non-
members. In his study, as a strategic effect it is meant the decrease of the motive for 
protection among the members of RTA. This is because the member government’s ability to 
shift profits from foreign firms to domestic is reduced and under the rules of RTA the firms of 
the member countries are allowed to capture the market shares from the firms outside the 
RTA. Therefore, this reduces the incentives of the governments to raise external tariffs. As 
distributive effect Ornelas (2005b, 473) means the political reasons for the trade protection. 
Some of the lobbies demand more trade protection, which causes that the government raises 
the  price  in  the  RTA.  In  this  way,  the  governments  are  able  to  shift  the  surplus  from  
consumers to domestic producers and use tariffs as a distributive device. However, RTA 
makes this form of protection weak, because the removal of internal tariffs among members 
shifts the share of a home market from the domestic firms to the firms in the other member 
countries. This leads to the reduction of the capability of the RTA governments to shift 
surplus from consumers to producers via high external tariffs, because part of the surplus of 
the consumers goes now to partner’s firms. This then leads the RTA governments to lower 
their external tariffs. (Ornelas 2005b, 473.) The conclusions of Ornelas (2005b) model are 
slightly different in comparison with Viner. This is because Ornelas (2005b, 483-484) model 
depicts that the trading block creates trade both within a bloc and with the non-members. In 
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this thesis, Ornelas (2005b) model is used as a theoretical basis to explain the possibility to 
RTA to be trade creating, as it widely takes into the consideration the role of the government 
in the decision making and determines external tariffs endogenously. Both of these factors are 
essential when forming regional trade agreements. 
 
3.1.1 The Idea of the Model 
 
The basic idea of this Ornelas’ (2005b, 471) oligopolistic-political-economy model is to 
analyze in a unified framework the direct impact of RTAs on world trade flows and welfare 
and their effect on the incentives for further liberalization on a non-discriminatory basis by 
treating the trade policy as endogenous decision. The model is represented in its original form 
expect term FTA is changed to be RTA so that the terms in theory would be consistent with 
the other parts of the study. The model takes into the consideration the role of the government 
in the trade liberalization and with the model it is easy to review the possible trade effects of 
the regional trade agreements. In Chapter 3.1, I will concentrate on the trade creation effect, 
but  I  will  also  discuss  the  effect  of  discriminatory  tariffs  on  further  liberalization  on  a  non-
discriminatory basis, because it operates as a base for the direct impact of RTAs on world 
trade flows and welfare. Though, I will go it through more precisely in Chapter 3.4. 
The idea of the model is to show with the help of proposition 3 of Ornelas’ study that if the 
fall in external tariffs is deep enough trade creation will appear between the members of the 
trade bloc. Also, as a consequence the trade creation will be found between RTA members 
and non-members. (Ornelas 2005b, 483-484.) This means that overall trade creation occurs 
and no trade diversion takes place in this case.8  
 
3.1.2 The Trade Creation in the Oligopolistic Model 
 
In the model, Ornelas (2005b) suggests that governments that are more easily influenced by 
special interest groups such as industries, are more protectionists. However, those 
governments  as  members  of  RTAs are  also  more  willing  to  reduce  external  tariffs  under  an  
                                               
8 The influence of internal tariff reduction on external tariffs is discussed more detailed in the Chapter 3.4. 
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RTA.9 (Ornelas 2005b, 482.) Therefore, the estimation of the change in external tariffs is 
critical to evaluate the RTA impact on trade flows. 
The model is built by first explaining the influence of RTA on nondiscriminatory tariff 
reduction that operates as a base for the theory of trade effects. In the model, the decision to 
form a regional trade agreement is endogenously determined which is in line with the 
empirical  part.  In  addition  to  be  able  to  explain  the  formation  of  regional  trade  agreements  
endogenously, also the choice of external tariffs has to be endogenous. (Ornelas 2005b, 491.) 
This detail creates a clear contrast between the results of this model and previous literature 
(See Krishna 1998). 
In  the  model  it  is  assumed  that  the  regional  trade  agreement  in  question  includes  M>2  
countries that are divided into two groups: M ? [2, N-1] prospective members of the 
agreement  and  N-M outsiders.  In  the  model  in  each  country  there  are  two sectors  of  which  
another is competitive (X) and another oligopolistic (Q). Both of the goods are homogenous 
and produced under constant returns to scale. Technologies are identical across countries and 
labour (L) as an only input is inelastically supplied in each country. Therefore, the trade 
results only from the oligopolistic behavior in sector (Q). (Ornelas 2005b, 475-480.) 
Both internal and external tariffs have essential roles in the model. Internal (????) and external 
tariffs (??) represent the government’s tariff on imports from its prospective (M-1) trading 
partners and from the (N-M) excluded countries. (Ornelas 2005b, 479.) In the Ornelas’ model 
the external tariff is endogenously determined, which is why the model has some different 
features compared to models where the external tariffs are taken as given (See Krishna 1998). 
In the nonexistence of RTA, the government chooses both internal (????) and external tariffs 
(??). Thus the cost symmetry implies that ???? ? ?? ?? t? in equilibrium. Instead, under a 
RTA ?? ?? t?? ?in equilibrium, because ???? = 0 and only ?? is  chosen  freely.  As  political  
tariffs, t? and t?? , it is meant the external tariff when the oligopolistic industry payoff is 
constant  and  export  profits  are  unaffected  by  the  choice  of  local  tariff.  In  addition,  the  
political tariff ensures the efficiency in the bargaining process between industry and 
government. The political tariffs are solved in the absence of RTA and under RTA later in 
this chapter to be able to solve the trade effects. (Ornelas 2005b, 478-479.) 
                                               
9 The governments are willing to reduce external tariffs, because a regional trade agreement makes any increase 
in the external tariffs less effective in enhancing the domestic firm’s profits. This is also supported by the 
strategic and distributive effects. Therefore, the government and the oligopolistic industry find it optimal to settle 
for a lower tariff, relative to the situation before RTA. 
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The  theory  of  Ornelas  (2005b,  480)  assumes  that  if  we  take  any  two country  pairs  that  are  
members  of  a  RTA,  the  sales  of  every  firm  j  in  the  home  market  depend  both  on  internal  
tariffs (????)  and  external  tariffs  (??).  That  is  why  the  sales  of  the  domestic  market  under  a  
RTA (????? = 0) can be defined as: 
??
? (??) ????(??, 0)     (8) 
By using an imperfect competition framework the theory assumes that the trade creation 
effect is explained by using the choices of each oligopolistic firm. To make choices about the 
sales in the home market, each oligopolistic firm choice satisfies the following conditions by 
assuming that under RTA ???? = 0  and otherwise ???? ?? ?? . (Ornelas 2005b, 492.) 
?
?
?
?
?
???
???
? ? ? ? ???? = 0
???
???
? ? ? ? ???? ?????? = 0
???
???
? ? ? ? ???? ???? = 0     (9) 
To be able to find out how regional trade agreements influence on trade, the first-order 
conditions above are summed for each domestic firms, for each of the n(M-1) partner firms 
and for each of the n(N-M) firms outside the RTA. Thus the trade effect of the RTA can be 
defined as:  nN(?? ? ?c)– ???– ?n(?? ? ?1)???? ? ?n(? ?M)?? = 0   (10) 
To  be  able  to  obtain  the  equilibrium  price  as  a  function  of  tariffs  and  parameters  in  the  
equation (13), the linear demand for the oligopolistic good is needed: 
?(?) ? ? ? ?      (11) 
? ? ? ? ? ?       (12) 
In the equations (11) and (12), Q denotes aggregate consumption, P(Q) represents the 
market’s inverse demand for the oligopolistic good and A > c. Therefore, by substituting the 
equation (12) to equation (10), the equilibrium price as a function of tariffs and parameters 
will be gained and it will be used later to find out the levels of pre and post RTA sales. p(??? ????) = {A + n?[cN + (?? 1)???? ??(??M)??]}/(1 + nN)   (13) 
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Before the RTA is established, ???? ?? ?? , and under the RTA ???? = 0. (Ornelas 2005b, 481.) 
To be able to solve the trade effect of the RTA, it is important to solve the political tariff  ?? 
in  the  absence  of  RTA  (equation  14)  and  under  RTA  (equation  (15).  It  can  be  solved  as  a  
function of ???? by using the equation that tells the influence of internal tariff to external 
tariff.10 
?? = ??????(???)???(??)
???
                                                  (14) 
??
? = ??????(???)???? ???? ?
????
                     (15) 
In the equations, b represents the extent of the government’s predilection for contributions 
(Ornelas 2005b, 477). The political tariff is strictly increasing in b. Nevertheless if b is too 
high, a prohibitive tariff obtains. Anyhow, the model is restricted so that b < 1/2n, when the 
political tariff is non-prohibitive, which means that the external tariff does not overprotect 
domestic industries. In the model M > 2. Therefore it can be discovered that the denominator 
of  the  equation  (15)  is  greater  than  in  the  equation  (14).  Therefore  the  political  tariff  under  
RTA is smaller than before RTA (??
? ?? ??), which means that the external tariff decreases as 
a consequence of RTA. (Ornelas 2005b, 480-481.) 
In addition, as a consequence of trade liberalization, the sales from one partner country to 
another change from ???(??) to ???? ???? ?.  To  find  out  if  the  trade  flows  increase  when the  
regional trade agreement is established, the following equation has to hold: 
???
? ???
? ? ? ????(??)     (16) 
To solve the levels of pre- and post-RTA sales in the equation (16), the equilibrium price 
equation  (13)  is  used  after  taking  the  first  order  conditions  of  the  firms11. Therefore, the 
equation (17) explains the amount of trade when the RTA is not operative and therefore 
                                               
10The influence of the internal tariff to external tariff is solved from this equation:  
???
???
?? ?
n(?? 1)?? [1/2 + ?n(1 + b)] ?q?(??? ????)? ?????(1 + nM) ?? [1/2 + ?n(1 + b)]?q?(?? ? ????)? ????? 
Because in the equation the numerator is positive and denominator is positive, if the following equation holds: (1? ? ?nN)(1 + nM) ?? ?12? ?n(1 + b)? n(N?M) 
The latter inequality is used to find out the trade effects of the trade liberalization. 
11 ??(??? ????) = ? ??????? ????) ?? ? ???? ????(???? ????) ???? ?? {?????[(???)?????(???)??]}????    
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???? ?? ?? . Respectively the equation (18) explains the situation under the RTA, when ???? =0.  
??(??) = ? ??????) ????? ????(??)???? = [?????(???)??](????)   (17) 
??
? ???) = ? ??? ????? ? ???? (??) ???? = [?????(???)??](????)      (18) 
By deducting the equation (17) from the (18), the equation (19) is followed. 
??
? ???
? ? ????(??) = ?(???)???(????)??? ?
????
      (19) 
The trade flows have increased as a consequence of the trade liberalization if the equation 
(16) holds. The equation (16) holds if the left side of the equation (19) is positive. Because the 
denominator of the right side is always positive, the nominator has to be positive so that 
equation (16)? holds. The nominator is positive if: 
 ??
? ??? ?< (?1 + ?)/(1 + ??)     (20) 
By substituting the political tariff equations (14) and (15) to the equation (20), the inequality 
holds if: 
???????
? ???
? )
?????????????
< ????
????
      (21) 
????
? ???
? ? ? ???(??)       (22) 
The last inequality can be expressed more generally as ??
? ???
? , 0? ? ???(??? ??). Therefore, 
the trade due to trade liberalization has increased, if equation (22)12 holds. Because 
??(??? ????) is increasing in (17) and (18) and ??? ?? ??, the inequality of equation (22) must 
hold. Therefore, the trade creation in the bloc is a consequence of the trade liberalization. 
(Ornelas 2005b, 483.) 
The same assumptions as in the trade creation hypothesis can be used to prove the increase in 
trade between RTA members and non-members, because of ??(??) = ? ??????) ????? =
???(??) ????. In addition, according to the model since the tariffs do not change outside the 
RTA, the trade flows stays constant among RTA non-members. 
                                               
12 The equation (22) is equal to equation (16). 
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Even though, the trade creation effect of the trading bloc was relatively straightforward to 
conclude, there are some other factors that influence on the trade flows between RTA 
members and non-members. 
The equation (19) can be rewritten in a way that two opposite forces affect the imports from 
non-members.  
??
? ???
? ? ????(??) = ?(???)??????? ???(???)??? ?
????
                         (23) 
On the right side, the first element in the square brackets corresponds the positive effect due 
to lower external tariffs and the second represents the negative effect due to discrimination. 
According to the theory of Ornelas (2005b,483), the positive effect exceeds the negative 
effect, which means that trade flows between members and non-members strictly increase. In 
addition, another important fact can be discovered from the equation (23). In the equation 
(23), the positive effect due to the lower external tariffs is greater than the negative effect due 
to the discrimination. This finding is in contrast to all the studies where an external tariff has 
been exogenously determined. This difference proves the fact that if the external tariff is 
endogenously determined, no trade diversion exists. However, in the case of exogenously 
determined external tariffs, the regional trade agreements are trade diverting at least to some 
extent (See Krishna 1998). (Ornelas 2005b, 483-484.) The case of exogenously determined 
external tariffs is analyzed more profoundly in Chapter 3.2 and more comparison between 
these two models is done.  
Finally, it is possible to conclude the basic relation between trade liberalization and trade in 
Ornelas’ model. Let’s assume that in the imperfect market a regional trade agreement is 
established. This RTA is decided by the governments of the member countries. Governments 
only want to become a member of the RTA if RTA improves welfare in their own countries 
meaning that the trade flows have to increase as a consequence of the agreement. This trade 
creation inside the trading bloc partly increases the welfare. Because of the strategic and 
distributive  effects  the  endogenously  determined  external  tariffs  decrease  in  the  model  as  a  
consequence of the decrease of internal tariffs, also non-members’ welfare increases. 
Therefore, if an RTA is actually established it will increase welfare in every country. Hence, 
in the paper of Ornelas (2005b, 474) it is suggested that at least from the “static” standpoint 
the recent increase of regional trade agreements should be regarded as a blessing for the world 
trading system because of the lack of trade diversion. It is important to pay attention that this 
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oligopolistic-political-economy model is only suitable when analyzing the trade effects of the 
agreements where the government supports the agreements that are welfare improving and 
when the external tariffs are treated endogenously fixed. (Ornelas 2005b.) 
 
3.2 Trade Diversion 
 
It is important to examine the trade diversion effect to find out the overall impact of regional 
trade agreements on world trade and welfare. The trade diversion is known as a negative 
outcome of regional trade agreements, because of the export losses the non-member may face. 
The trade diversion occurs when the members of trade union substitute an efficient non-
member country with less efficient, but under RTA less costly member country (Calvo-Pardo, 
Freund & Ornelas 2009, 5). Of course, the trade inside the trading bloc increases but at the 
expense of non-members. 
In the oligopolistic-political-economy model explained in Chapter 3.1, it was assumed that the 
establishment  of  the  regional  trade  agreements  depends  on  the  government  and  that  the  
governments only support the welfare-improving trade agreements in spite of their political 
motivations. However, the governments have other than welfare improving motivations even 
though they are influenced by other interest groups. For this reason, it is not unambiguous that 
governments only seek the trade-creating regional trade agreements as it was assumed in 
Ornelas (2005b) study. (Freund & Ornelas 2010, 142.) However, if governments were 
primarily interested in the national welfare in their countries, only trade-creating and welfare-
improving regional trade agreements would come into force as it was shown in the previous 
Chapter 3.1.  
Also the impact of regional trade agreements on trade diversion has been widely studied by 
using a framework, where the role of the government is essential. The aim of this chapter is to 
shed  light  on  how  the  establishing  of  the  regional  trade  agreements  depends  on  the  
government’s objectives and the influence of this on the agreement’s trade effects.  
Grossman and Helpman (1995) developed a framework about the influence of governments 
on regional trade agreements. Later Krishna (1998) followed them. In the political-economy 
frameworks of both of these studies, governments seek primarily trade diverting regional 
trade agreements instead of trade creating. Both of the studies keep an external tariff 
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exogenously fixed, if they are influenced by special interest group. Therefore, the 
assumptions of the determination of the external tariff and trade effect are already different in 
the beginning compared with Ornelas (2005b). Though, the government is influenced by 
special interest groups also in Ornelas (2005b) study. The requirement for the political 
feasibility of a RTA holds in Krishna’s model, but not in Ornelas, because external tariffs are 
obtained endogenously in Ornelas study (Ornelas 2005b, 474). Next, I will represent 
Krishna’s simple oligopolistic model that describes a situation where the government is 
influenced by a special interest group and the influence of this on the agreement’s trade 
effects. In addition the differences between the model of Ornelas (2005b) and Krishna (1998) 
are discussed. 
 
3.2.1 The Idea of the Model 
 
The basic idea of this political economy approach of Krishna (1998) is based on the imperfect 
competition with oligopolistic firms that produce goods that are perfect substitutes for each 
other. The markets, where governments establish RTAs, are segmented. In the model, the 
decision of the government is based only on their impact on the profits of the domestic firms. 
(Krishna 1998, 229.) 
In the model, the role of the producers is decisive in determining to which bilateral tariff 
reducing arrangements are entered into. Therefore, the trade policy is chosen by considering 
the gains or the losses of the domestic firms under the different regional trade agreements 
being considered. With these assumptions, if the regional trade agreement does not generate 
trade diversion, firms in every member country just obtain higher market shares and profits on 
the other member’s market but lose domestic profits. This implies only little or no net profits 
to them and therefore the membership of the RTA is not attractive. (Krishna 1998, 229.) In 
this chapter, I will concentrate on explaining the possible reasons for trade diversion and 
concentrate on the factors that lead to different results compared to the model of Ornelas that 
was analyzed in the previous Chapter 3.1. With this trade diversion model the idea is to show 
that the regional trade area has to be trade diverting so that the government will support the 
agreements which is opposite assumption to the model of Ornelas’. Also it is discussed the 
possibilities to establish regional trade agreement without trade diversion. 
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3.2.2 The Trade Diversion in the Political Economy Approach 
 
In the model, Krishna (1998, 229) suggests that governments are more supportive towards the 
RTAs with the trade diverting feature. This is because the profits gained of the possible 
member countries have to be larger under the bilateral agreement in order to governments to 
support the agreement. This makes the establishment of the agreements more challenging and 
brings out the possibility of trade diversion, because only seldom larger profits are gained by 
increasing the market shares in other member’s market. However, if the regional trade 
agreement allows firms in the member countries to displace the firms from non-member 
countries in each other’s markets, the RTA surely enhances profits for all members’ firms. Of 
course, this happens at the expense of outsiders. 
In the model it is assumed that X and Y are potential member countries of the agreement and 
Z is the rest of the world. To facilitate the analysis, it is assumed that: i= X, Y, Z and j=X, Y, 
Z to country indices. The regional trade agreement is supported by X and Y if equation (1) 
holds for X and equation (2) for Y: [??? ? ??? ??]?? < ???? ? ??? ???(1 + ?? ? ??)   (1) 
???
? ? ??
?
?
???? < ???? ? ??? ???(1 + ?? ? ??)   (2) 
In the equations ???  denotes the equilibrium quantities to be sold without regional trade 
agreement, ??? ??  denotes the equilibrium quantities sold under the agreement, and ?? denotes 
the amount of firms in i. Therefore, by using these two equations, it is possible to find out the 
change in sales as a consequence of bilateral agreement. (Krishna 1998, 230-234.) 
To be exact, the equations (1) and (2) above can be interpreted so that the sales in the partner 
country have to be adequately large relative to home country the agreement to be supported 
by the home country. This is because the only thing that is lost under the agreement is the 
share in the home market. Therefore, if two equations above hold, it is known that with a 
bilateral agreement a better access to partner’s market is gained. Thus the larger the partner’s 
market, the greater the gains, because the gains depend on the size of the market. (Krishna 
1998, 234-235.) 
From two equations above, it can be perceived that the gains in Y’s market come from two 
sources: First, direct effect that results from the reduction of tariffs imposed by Y against X. 
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This reduces the effective marginal costs in Y from c+t to c. The direct effect is expressed as 
“1”  on  the  right-hand  side  of  the  equations  (1)  and  (2)  above.  Second,  strategic  effect  is  a  
competitive advantage that firms from X gain over the firms from Y and Z. The competitive 
advantage is gained because the marginal costs of X’s firms relative to firms from Y and Z 
shifts the equilibrium conditions in X’s favor. The strategic effect is the part ??? ? ??) in the 
equations (1) and (2) above. Therefore, the larger the number of firms in the foreign market or 
rest of the world, the greater the strategic effect. The condition (2) that can be interpreted 
exactly the same way as (1) needs to hold for Y to support the bilateral agreement. (Krishna 
1998, 234-235.) 
In Figure 4, a political economy approach for the trade diversion is represented. The idea of 
Figure 4 is to shows how the trade diversion relaxes the conditions that the sales in the partner 
country have to be sufficiently large relative to home country sales so that the agreement is 
supported by the home country. This is because the chance for trade diversion makes it easier 
to gain within the RTA. The line XX represents the conditions where the sales in the partner 
country  Y  are  sufficiently  large  relative  to  home  X  in  a  situation  where  YY  represents  the  
conditions where the sales in the partner country X are sufficiently large relative to home Y. 
Mathematically the conditions that support the agreement can be expressed for X as: 
?? < ???? ???2 + 2?? + 2??? ? ?????? ? ????)? ? ????)? ? ?(1 ? ??)? (3) 
And for Y: 
?? < ???? ??(2 + 2?? + 2??)? ?????? ? ????)? ? ????)? ? ?(1? ??)? (4)  
Next, let’s consider Figure 4 how the change in the trade diversion influences on the regional 
trade agreement to be supported in the model. As it has already been discussed the more the 
RTA increases gains, the more willing the government is to join the RTA. 
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Figure 4 The Trade Diversion (Source: Krishna 1998, 238) 
In Figure 4 above, when the number of firms in the rest of the world is ??, the bilateral 
agreement is supported by X at all points above the line XX. The agreement is supported by Y 
at all points below YY. Therefore, the area XOY is where both of the member countries 
support the bilateral agreement. 
Because the number of firms in Z can be anything, it is important to consider a situation, 
where the ?? increases to ??? . Because  the  right-hand  sides  of  the  equations  (3)  and  (4)  are  
increasing in ??, also the number of firms gaining strategic competitive advantage from X (in 
Y) and from Y (in X) is larger. Therefore, the strategic effect that causes a larger trade 
diversion is larger for both of the firms from X selling in Y and for firms from Y selling in X. 
Therefore, the larger the number of firms in Z, the greater the trade diversion is. Thus the 
more likely it is that the agreement is supported by the partner countries when ?? increases. 
(Krishna 1998, 236.) 
Therefore, when the amount of firms in the rest of the world increases to ??? , the area where 
both countries would support the agreement increases in Figure 4 to X’O’Y’. The area XOY 
is contained entirely to this area. This is possible to depict by expressing the equality from the 
equation (3) as  
?? ? ???(??)? ??      (5) 
Y’
Y’
Y
Y
X
X
X’
X’
O’
O
?Y
?X
The agreement is 
supported by X and YThe agreement is 
supported by X
The agreement is 
supported by Y
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In the equation (5), ??(??) < 0.  Therefore  we know that  line  XX shifts  down and  the  slope  
decreases. In addition, when ?? increases the right-hand side of the equation (5) increases. 
Consequently, for equation (3) to hold with equality, also ?? has to increase.  This leads the 
line XX to shift lower as it was shown in Figure 4. (Krishna 1998, 238.) 
According to Krishna’s theory some trade diversion is needed for the bilateral agreement to 
benefit both X and Y. The larger the number of firms from the rest of the world, the larger the 
trade diversion can be. To be able to define the amount of diverting trade it is crucial to define 
X’s initial volume of imports from the rest of the world Z: 
 ??
????) ??? ? (1 + ??)?     (6) 
With a bilateral agreement the volume of imports is: 
 ??
????) ??? ? ?1 + ?? ? ????    (7) 
Therefore, it is known that, the volume diverting trade is: 
????(???)? ?? + 1)?     (8) 
The equation (8) is increasing in ??. So when the amount of firms in Z increases to ???, the 
curve XX shifts to down to X’X’ and YY up to Y’Y’ in Figure 4 above. (Krishna 1998, 247.) 
Consequently the area where both of the countries X and Y support the agreement increases 
with the trade diversion as Figure 4 shows from XOY to X’O’Y’. The area XOY is entirely 
included in this larger area. (Krishna 1998, 238.) 
With this framework Krishna (1998) reaches two conclusions: first, the regional trade 
agreements, that are trade diverting, are more likely to be supported by member countries and 
therefore also politically. This is because the firms from each member country under the 
regional trade agreement gain preferential access to the partner’s market. In the partner’s 
market, they gain both against the partner country’s firms and by diverting trade away from 
the rest of the world’s firms. The protection in the domestic market is lost only against partner 
country firms. Therefore, if no trade is diverted away from firms from the rest of the world, 
member countries only gain in their partner’s market and lose in their own market against 
partner’s firms. Thus the regional trade agreement is a zero-sum game. Therefore without 
trade diversion it is less likely that firms from both member countries would gain under the 
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agreement when external tariffs are determined exogenously. Therefore, trade agreement 
without trade diversion is less likely supported in this model. 
Second, if the trade followed by the regional trade agreement, is diverted away in both of the 
partner country markets from the rest of the world, both member countries gain. Therefore, 
the bilateral agreement is more likely to be supported politically. In addition, the larger the 
trade diversion is, the more likely it is that both member countries would support the 
agreement as Figure 4 depicts. 
An interesting difference in the models of Krishna (1998) and Ornelas (2005b) is the 
determination  of  an  external  tariff.  As  it  has  already  been  discussed,  Ornelas  (2005b)  treats  
external tariffs endogenously fixed. If Ornelas determined the external tariffs exogenously as 
Krishna (1998) does in the model, some trade diversion would also exist in Ornelas’ (2005b) 
model as the equation (23) in Ornelas’ model depicts. 
The second main difference in Ornelas’ model appears in the part where the partner firms 
capture under the agreement the market shares that are taken away from the outside firms 
through  higher  tariffs.  After  the  partner  firms  have  taken  the  market  shares  away  from  the  
outside firms in Ornelas model (2005b), the member countries are no longer able to improve 
the comparative advantage of their countries via own trade policies. As the partner firms 
(special interest groups) are aware of this, they start giving less compensation to governments. 
This decrease of compensation encourages the governments to decrease the external tariffs 
and become less protectionist, because governments that are less influenced by special 
interest groups are less protectionists (Ornelas 2005b). Contrary in Krishna’s model, the 
partner firms (special interest group) determine the trade policy despite the consequences of 
the regional trade agreement. They do not act as the special interest groups in Ornelas (2005b) 
model. In Ornelas’ model the reason why special interest group loses its interest on giving 
compensation to the government is the capability to improve comparative advantage. This 
way the special interest group resigns the right to decide about the trade policy in the model 
of Ornelas. However, in the model of Krishna the special interest groups continue to influence 
the decisions of the government. Therefore, these differences lead to different outcomes in the 
case of external tariffs and trade effects as well as in the case of multilateral liberalization.  
As the trade policy change in Ornelas’ model decreases the external tariffs also the 
multilateral trade liberalization becomes favorable. Therefore, in Ornelas (2005b) model, the 
regional trade agreements support multilateral trade liberalization, while in the model of 
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Krishna free trade agreements reduce the incentives for multilateral trade liberalization. This 
is because in Krishna’s model the rents for producers from the trade-diverting preferential 
agreements are tied to preferences granted by the bilateral agreement and the rents are lost in 
the case of multilateral liberalization. Therefore, the preferential agreements may be preferred 
over multilateral trade agreements in the model of Krishna (1998). Behind this difference is 
the determination of external tariffs, which is the main difference in these two models. 
 
3.2.3 How to Avoid Trade Diversion? 
 
Even though Krishna (1998) keeps the idea of trade diversion as a starting point for the trade 
liberalization, some researchers have concentrated on how to establish a regional trade 
agreement so that the trade diversion is avoided. Among others Kemp and Wan (1976) 
created a model where it is possible to form a custom union and avoid trade diversion. Later 
on Panagariya and Krishna (2002) applied it to free trade areas where members have their 
own external tariffs. Before Panagariya and Krishna (2002), the progress in the literature 
about this subject has been minimal. The problem that arises with these models if they are 
applied to the model of Krishna is the non-supportive attitude of the governments towards 
lack of trade diversion. 
In the custom union model, it is possible to avoid trade diversion by freezing their net external 
trade vector with the rest of the world through a set of common external tariffs and remove 
the barriers to trade in the union. The common tariff vector is consistent with pre-union world 
prices  as  well  as  pre-union  trade  patterns  and  levels  of  welfare  for  non-members.  As  a  
consequence, the welfare of the union in the aggregate necessarily improves without letting 
the welfare of the rest of the world to fall. (Kemp & Wan 1976, 95-97.) By setting the 
combined, extra-union trade vector of member countries at its pre-union level, it can be 
ensured that the welfare of the non-members stays at the original level and the trade diversion 
that was explained in Chapter 3.2 will not occur. Of course, this may lead to the situation 
where  the  RTA  is  not  at  all  supported  by  the  government  and  therefore  it  will  not  be  
established. Especially, if the special interest groups behave as in Krishna’s (1998) model. 
This setting without trade diversion would make the regional trade agreements in Krishna’s 
(1998) model non-profitable. However, interesting in the proposition is that it does not limit 
the size or number of countries which belong to the union, their pre- or post-union trading 
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relationships, the relative states of development, levels of average income, the geographical 
distance, or transportation costs. (Kemp & Wan 1976, 95-97.) 
Later Panagariya and Krishna (2002) applied the theory of Kemp and Wan (1976) to also 
cover free trade areas. They assumed that two countries, Home and Foreign, form a regional 
trade area and instead of common external tariff vector, the members have member-specific 
external tariff vectors. Member countries adopt the rules of origin, which means that goods 
consumed in Foreign are not permitted to be imported via Home at lower tariff and vice versa. 
In the regional trade area equilibrium, the prices of the imported goods that are not produced 
within the union are different between the partner countries. The reasons for this are the 
different external tariff rates and the fact that rules of origin prohibit the low-tariff member 
(Home) from importing goods from outside the RTA in the high-tariff country (Foreign). 
(Panagariya & Krishna 2002, 356.) Because the post-RTA tariffs are higher in Foreign than 
Home, the output produced within the regional trade area is sold in Foreign. If the post-union 
tariffs were equal in Home and Foreign, the situation would be as in the custom union and the 
internal supply is sold to both countries. (Panagariya & Krishna 2002, 358.) To conclude, 
according to Panagariya and Krishna (2002) it is possible to establish a welfare-improving 
FTA if each member country individually imports the same vector of quantities from the rest 
of the world in the post-FTA equilibrium as in the pre-FTA equilibrium and follows the rules 
of origin. Also in a case where bilateral tariffs are reduced only on imports from countries that 
already are the lowest-cost supplier, trade diversion does not occur (Baldwin & Venables 
1995, 1603). This model does not take into the consideration the role of the government in the 
trade liberalization which is why the model keeps the trade diversion as a negative 
consequence of the regionalism. That is why there is a chance that the RTA will not be 
established if there is a doubt of trade diversion to take place. 
 
3.4 The Influence of Discriminatory Tariff Reduction Broader Liberalization 
 
As Ornelas (2005b, 471) model for trade creation drops a hint of the positive relationship of 
discriminatory and nondiscriminatory tariff reduction also other researchers have paid 
attention to that. In this chapter it is shortly reviewed some viewpoints within this issue.  
In general one of the three goals of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the successors of 
GATT (General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade), is the trade opening via multilateral trading 
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system13. However, countries are establishing RTAs themselves and removing bilateral 
tariffs. Because these two actions take place at the same time, the question under review has 
been, whether one helps another?  
Baldwin and Venables (1995, 1636) studied, if the membership of a RTA leads the countries 
to set higher external trade barriers which may cause a breakdown of the multilateral trading 
system. They pointed out that external tariffs are set to maximize the welfare of the countries 
or region. By using this idea, Ornelas (2005b) in his oligopolistic-political economy model 
that was used in Chapter 3.1 to explain trade creation suggested that the reduction of 
discriminatory tariffs enhances the reduction of external tariffs. In addition Ornelas (2005b, 
480) depicts that the larger the RTA in question, the larger are the reductions of external 
tariffs. Therefore, Ornelas (2005b, 474) concludes that the regionalism can be regarded as a 
blessing for the world trading system because of the trade creation effect and decrease of 
external tariffs. 
The study of Estevadeordal, Freund and Ornelas (2008, 1532-1537) supports the fact that 
RTAs lead to a decrease in nondiscriminatory tariffs. They justify this with the empirical 
result. In addition they state three facts why the RTAs are positively correlated with external 
trade liberalization having their stress on developing countries. First, RTAs are seen to have 
greater impact on multilateral tariff reduction in the developing countries because thus far the 
impact of multilateral system on tariff reduction has been small in developing countries to 
which BIC-countries are still categorized according to IMF. Second, as the theory predicts 
high external tariffs gives more motivation to reduce external tariffs and this way the political 
interest moves away from protectionism and multilateralism spreads. Third, some products 
may  be  easier  to  liberalize  than  others  which  means  that  trade  in  these  products  is  often  
liberalized both regionally and multilaterally. 
In their studies Richardson (1993) and Bagwell and Staiger (2001) obtain results that are in 
line with Ornelas’ (2005b) proposition of the relationship. One difference in the models is that 
their results were obtained in a competitive framework. According to their studies, the tariff 
revenue and terms of trade enforces governments to lower external tariffs under a RTA. 
                                               
13 In the multilateral trading system tariffs and other barriers to trade are reduced for all countries that are 
members of the WTO. Therefore, the multilateral agreements differ from the regional trade agreements where 
the negotiations of the tariffs only relate to the members of the agreement. (Sawyer & Sprinkle 2004, 205) 
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Ornelas (2005a) sheds light to a viewpoint of a negative relationship of nondiscriminatory and 
discriminatory tariff reduction. Ornelas (2005a, 1717) suggests that the reduction of 
protection against the non-members is done to generate overall trade creation. This causes the 
access of non-member countries to integrating markets to increase. In unison, the extra gains 
from multilateral liberalization decrease because the costs of multilateralism are kept 
constant. Therefore, this trade creation may reverse the support of the excluded countries to 
multilateral liberalization. This means that RTAs may cause harm to multilateral trading 
system by causing the non-members to hinder multilateralism. 
To conclude, the opinions of this relationship between trade liberalization and multilateralism 
fluctuate. No unambiguous conclusion is possible to drawn in this topic. However, a common 
factor that connects the opposite viewpoints is the reduction of external tariffs that occurs in 
both of the situations. 
 
3.5 The Role of the Characteristics of the Country pairs in Trade Liberalization 
 
The role of the characteristics of the partner countries in the regional trade agreement is 
significant. The characteristics influence on both the probability of the establishment of the 
agreements and the influence of the agreement on non-member countries. Since Viner, the 
theoretical studies have shown that the welfare effects of the regional trade agreements can be 
positive or negative depending on the countries involved in the trade bloc. (Magee 2003, 1.) 
In this chapter, the importance of characteristics is reviewed as a base for the empirical part.  
When a term optimal partner country is mentioned in the context of regional trade 
agreements, it is meant that it is more likely that countries with specific characteristics, either 
economic  or  non-economic,  sign  on  an  agreement.  Many  researchers  have  tried  to  find  out  
which characteristics of partner countries make more likely to reach the regional trade 
agreement. Bair and Bergstrand (2004), Krueger (1999) and Lee and Shin (2006) 
concentrated on economic factors. Magee (2003) studied the role of both the economic and 
non-economic factors. I discuss each approach in turn, with my focus on non-economic 
factors. 
There are some explanations for the use of the economic factors of the partner countries in 
determining regional trade agreements. In their study Baier and Bergstrand (2004), examined 
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econometrically the key economic factors influencing the likelihood of country pairs forming 
a free trade agreement. According to their study, country pairs tend to have particular 
economic characteristics that according to theory should foster the country pair’s net trade 
creation and welfare. They divided the economic determinants of trade creation and diversion 
into three groups. The first is the economic geography factors. Trade creation is larger the 
closer  two  countries  are,  and  trade  diversion  is  less  the  further  two  continental  trading  
partners are from the ROW. The second category is intra-industry determinants. The trade 
creation is greater the larger and more similar are the economic sizes of the two countries and 
trade diversion is less the smaller is the economic size of the ROW. The third category is the 
inter-industry trade determinants. Trade creation is greater the wider are the relative factor 
endowments between two countries, and trade diversion is less the smaller the difference 
between the relative factor endowments of the pair and that of ROW. (Baier & Bergstrand 
2004, 33.) They found empirical support for all three groups of characteristics predicting 
FTAs.14 The economic characteristics can predict correctly 85 % of the 286 FTAs existing 
among 1431 country pairs in 1996. (Baier & Bergstrand 2004, 50.) 
Magee (2003) also studied which countries are expected to establish regional trade 
agreements having the same assumption about the endogeneity of bilateral trade flows and 
regional trade agreements with Baier and Bergstrand (2004). In addition to economic factors, 
he concentrated on political factors. Magee (2003, 7) found out that countries are more likely 
to form RTA if they already have significant bilateral trade, are similar in capital-labor ratios, 
are similar in size as well as are both democracies. Therefore, the results indicate that both 
economic and political factors are important in shaping the agreements. The findings of 
Magee (2003) about the economic size of the countries are in line with the findings of Baier 
and Bergstrand (2004). In addition, Magee (2003, 14) assumes that countries that have large 
bilateral trade flows are considered natural trading partners. 
As Baier and Bergstrand, Krueger (1999, 116) studied how the economic similarity influences 
on regional trade agreements. He states that regional trade agreements between a developed 
and developing country are more probable to improve welfare than an agreement between two 
developing or two developed countries. The reason for this assumption is that in the 
                                               
14 Baier and Bergstrand found that the likelihood of FTA between a country pair is higher (1) the closer in 
distance the countries are; (2) the further a natural pair is from ROW; (3) the larger and more similar country 
pair is economically; (4) the greater the difference in capital-labor endowment ratios between two countries; and 
(5) the less is the difference in capital-labor endowment ratios of the member countries relative to that of the 
ROW due to less inter-industry trade diversion. All these factors were economically and statistically significant 
effects on the probability of an FTA. 
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international trade theories, such as Ricardian and Heckscher-Ohlin, countries with alike 
technologies and capital-labor ratios receive no gains from trade with each other. Therefore, 
similar countries have less possibilities for gains from trade based comparative advantage, 
which is opposite to the findings of Magee (2003). 
There are few explanations for the use of the non-economic factors of the partner countries in 
determining regional trade agreements. (Magee, 2003) In general, culture is thought to have 
influence  on  economic  outcomes  by  affecting  personal  traits  such  as  honesty,  thrift,  
willingness to work hard, and openness to strangers. (Barro & McCleary 2003, 2.) Therefore, 
it can be assumed that similar culture has positive influence on determining regional trade 
areas. In addition to Magee (2003), Rose (2000) underlines that the existences of regional 
trade agreements have to be explained by non-economic factors, even though he does not 
specify non-economic factors more carefully. 
In previous research cultural variables are as well used as instruments for trust, which is seen 
to correlate with the regional trade agreements. Among others Rose (2000) and Baldwin 
(2006) support the fact that cultural factors can be used as instruments for regional trade 
agreements. Rose (2000) finds that historically regional trade agreements have increased trade 
by 235% by studying countries that have very close cultural roots. Baldwin (2006) instead 
only finds an increase of 9 % in trade as a consequence of regional trade agreements. In his 
study,  the  countries  were  not  as  culturally  close.  Therefore,  from  the  non-economic  factors  
similar culture enhances the born of regional trade agreements, which is why cultural 
variables could be excellent instruments for RTAs in the IV-estimation. 
Other researchers have also had attempts to find out the characteristics that make regional 
trade agreements more trade creating or more trade diverting.15 For this Frankel (1997) 
created the idea of natural trading partners, countries that already trade significantly. By 
natural trading partners it was meant the geographically close countries that may have the 
same culture that often leads to trade creation. In his theory, Frankel (1997, 40) lists 
characteristics of the countries that usually encouraged countries to trade. Features are such as 
geographically close countries and countries that share cultural characteristics. According to 
Frankel (1997) if two countries have these features the trade will be trade creating, which is 
also a consequence of trade unions. Lee and Shin (2006, 284) used geographical proximity as 
an indicator to trade creation and diversion. They created variable that show how much 
                                               
15 See e.g. Calvo-Pardo, Freund & Ornelas 2009; Lee & Shin, 2006 
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common language, geographical distance, land border between the member countries and area 
influence on trade creation and diversion. As a result, they found that if countries share the 
border and language and are geographically close the possibility of trade creation increases 
and trade diversion decreases. In Chapter 6, the country characteristics that influence on trade 
creation and diversion are studied in a case of BIC-countries. 
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4 Review of the Empirical Literature 
 
The literature and research about regional trade agreement started to develop in the 1950. In 
the 1960s as a consequence of the European integration, the research started to increase. 
Among others Bela Balassa studied integration from many perspectives.16 Furthermore, the 
wave of regionalization in the eighties increased the amount of research of regionalization in 
the theoretical and empirical literature. (Caporale, Rault, Sova & Sova 2008, 1.) From the 
economics  point  of  view,  the  most  common topics  of  research  in  regional  trade  agreements  
have been the influence of different regional trade agreements on trade. 
The increase in regionalism and the development of the regional trade agreements started to 
increase interest and significance among economists. Also the interest among other sciences 
appeared. Researchers of social science studied the topic trying to find out which countries 
are expected to form regional trade agreements (See Magee 2003). 
However, the empirical research about regional trade agreements started to increase in the 
beginning of the 1960s, when Tinbergen (1962) applied the gravity model to study 
international trade flows. He included the RTA dummy variable in the gravity equation and 
was the first to estimate the effects of regional trade areas on trade. In his first study, he found 
significant positive effects among members of British Commonwealth although insignificant 
for Benelux RTA. After Tinbergen (1962) various results about the influence of RTA have 
been found out. After Tinbergen (1962) numerous empirical analysis has used the gravity 
model and conducted to provide various verifications and conclusions to international trade.17 
Since the 1990s important changes in the research were noticed when the gravity model 
gained a lot of attention in the analysis of international trade. This was as a result of renewed 
interest in economic geography and increased interest on other kinds of factors of economic 
activities as well as the rapid expansion of free trade agreements in the 1990s. (Urata & 
Okabe 2007, 7.)  
The researches made in the 2000s have still mainly concentrated on major trade blocs. New 
aspects have been the interest in new members to European Union as well as the regional 
                                               
16 E.g. Balassa studied the trade creation and diversion in the European common market as well as the economic 
integration among developing countries. 
17 See e.g. Calvo-Pardo, Freund & Ornelas (2009); Baier & Bergstrand (2007); Caporale, Rault, Sova & Sova 
(2008); Lee & Shin (2006); Urata & Okabe (2007); Hellvin & Nilsson (2000); 
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trade areas in Asia.18 This was partly because trade liberalization took place in Asia later 
compared  to  other  continents.  (Pomfret  2007,  925.)  Also  new  aspects  such  as  the  effect  of  
regional trade areas in different sectors have appeared. 
Overall, the previous literature has concentrated mainly on the largest regional trade areas 
such as European Union, Mercosur, Nafta and ASEAN and most of them have used the 
gravity model as a research method. It is actually surprising that the trade liberalization of 
emerging countries has not been analyzed more profoundly in terms of trade integration 
within last few years, as it would obviously provide a rather profitable and exceptional 
framework for research. The number of empirical analyses of China, India and Brazil are 
modest as well. 
The first part of this chapter presents the most important studies related essentially to trade 
liberalization. Literature about the relationship of discriminatory and nondiscriminatory tariff 
reduction is excluded from the review. Despite the studies, where the relationship is analyzed 
along with the trade effects of the regional trade agreements, are expectations though. Second 
part of this chapter then covers empirical studies on trade liberalization that deal with 
emerging countries, specifically with BIC-countries. Most of the emerging country studies 
have concentrated predicting the trade potential of the countries. 
 
4.1 Empirical Studies on Trade Liberalization 
 
The study performed by Calvo-Pardo, Freund and Ornelas (2009) represents one of the most 
interesting ones in the category of trade liberalization. Even though the scope of this study is 
in the trade effects of the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement, its findings appear rather interesting 
also from the nondiscriminatory viewpoint of trade liberalization. Specifically, Calvo-Pardo et 
al. examined how the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement influenced the trade with non-members 
and external tariffs facing non-members. They studied the influences during the period of 
1992-2007 across HS 6-digit level industries by dividing the yearly data into six three-year 
periods. As a result, they found a positive influence of the ASEAN free trade agreement 
(AFTA) on imports inside the bloc. In addition, it seems that tariff reduction does not have 
lower import growth from non-members. Therefore, AFTA has had positive impact on trade 
                                               
18 Among others Calvo-Pardo, Freund and Ornelas (2009) studied the impact of ASEAN free trade agreement on 
trade flows. 
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among members without trade diversion. Also as a consequence of the lower internal tariff, 
the members of AFTA have lowered their external tariffs. This means that a causal 
relationship between preferential and MFN tariff reduction is found. Therefore, the 
preferential tariff reduction in AFTA has influenced on broader liberalization. 
Another interesting study on trade liberalization is provided by Baier and Bergstrand (2007). 
Baier and Bergstrand (2007) studied the influence of free trade agreements on trade in a new 
way. In their study, they criticize the assumption that free trade area is exogeneous variable. 
Therefore, they were the first ones to address the endogeneity of free trade agreements. The 
panel data that they use from 1969-2000 adjusts the endogeneity well. With this assumption 
Baier and Bergstrand (2007) found that after ten years free trade area has approximately 
doubled the trade between two members, which is seven times the effect estimated using 
OLS.  Therefore,  if  regional  trade  agreements  are  assumed  to  be  endogenous,  most  of  the  
previous studies of the effects of RTAs on trade flows may be biased. (Baier & Bergstrand 
2007, 74.) 
Also, Caporale, Rault, Sova and Sova (2008) shed light on the endogeneity of the free trade 
variable. They focused in their study free trade agreements between European Union (EU-15) 
and the Central Eastern European countries (CEEC-4 i.e. Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and 
Romania). To address these issues a dummy variable that represents the association 
agreement is introduced. In addition, the robustness of the agreement variable is studied in 
two different ways. First, an extended sample of countries including three countries (Belarus, 
Russian Federation and Ukraine) that did not sign the FTA with EU-15 even though countries 
belonged to the Communist bloc is considered. Second, different estimation methods are 
used. As a method, they used the fixed effect vector decomposition (FEVD) technique to be 
able to isolate and eliminate the potential endogeneity bias of the agreement variables and to 
obtain more robust results. The sample period spans the period 1987-2005. When Caporale et 
al. examined the bilateral trade effects between EU-15 and CEEC-4 countries, the positive 
and  significant  effect  of  regional  trade  agreements  on  trade.  Countries  that  signed  the  FTA  
with EU-15 exceeded the trade growth by 14 % of the control group of countries which did 
not become members. 
The study performed by Lee and Shin (2006) also represents an interesting aspect to the trade 
liberalization. Even though the scope of this study is to examine the possible trade creation 
and diversion effects in East Asia, Lee and Shin (2006) also pay attention to the country 
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characteristics that influence the RTA more likely to be trade-creating or trade-diverting. To 
be able to study the trade diversion effects, Lee and Shin (2006) introduce RTA dummy that 
gets value unity if another of the countries belongs to some regional trade area. With the same 
method both Urata and Okabe (2007) and Lee and Shin (2006) were able to capture the trade 
creation and diversion effects in their studies. The panel data covers 175 countries from 1948-
1999. To be able to capture how the characteristics of member countries affect trade creation 
and diversion, Lee and Shin (2006) define interaction terms between intra- and extra-bloc 
RTA dummies and variables such as distance, border, and language. Lee and Shin (2006) 
found in their study that in East Asia the regional trade agreements tend to be more trade 
creating than diverting. In line with the natural trading partner theory, Lee and Shin (2006) 
were able to show that country characteristics have significant impacts on trade creation and 
diversion. According to their findings, the countries that are located close and share a land 
border are more probably trade creating and less trade diverting. 
The study performed by Urata and Okabe (2007) is one of the most relevant studies about the 
impacts of free trade agreements on trade flows. They examined the impacts of free trade 
agreements on trade using two approaches. The first approach is to study the changes in trade 
patterns before and after an FTA by using the indicators of intra-FTA interdependence. 
Specifically, they measure the extent of dependency on foreign trade between and among 
FTA members. The second approach is to estimate the gravity equation to determine the 
impacts of FTA, such as trade creation and trade diversion, on trade flows. To be able to study 
this, they add two additional FTA dummies to the equation: FTAtononFTA and 
NonFTAtoFTA. Urata and Okabe (2007) extend the previous studies in the second approach 
by enlarging the sample size in terms of time-period and they also disaggregate the trade data 
to different sectors, because they assume that the impact of FTA is different for different 
sectors. Urata and Okabe (2007) found that FTA increased the trade in almost all the cases. 
By using the aggregate data, they found trade creation effect, but the trade diversion effect 
was limited. Both of these effects depended on the regional trade agreement in question. The 
positive trade creation was found for NAFTA, AFTA and MERCOSUR. Therefore, the trade 
diversion effect was found for all FTAs except MERCOSUR, EU-Mexico, and Japan-Mexico 
FTAs. With the disaggregated data, trade diversion was found only in EU, MERCOSUR and 
NAFTA. 
In the interest of researchers has also been how integrated two trading blocs are. Hellvin and 
Nilsson (2000) in their study examined the level of integration between EU, Asia and NAFTA 
45 
 
and possible extra-regional bias in the trade between the blocs. In the study, the actual trade 
flows were compared with projected trade based on gravity model estimation using OECD 
countries as a reference group. The estimation is done using the average of the years 1995 and 
1996 to be able to avoid possible temporary shocks. As a result, it was found that EU’s and 
NAFTA’s trade trade integration with Asia is above the average level of integration among 
the OECD countries. Instead, the integration is the weakest between EU and NAFTA and 
strongest between Asia and NAFTA. The integration between EU and Asia has been 
strengthened with the ASEM (Asia-Europe Meeting) meetings every two years. 
In the interest of Martinez-Zarzoso and Nowak Lehmann (2003) has also been the trade 
between two trading blocs, Mercosur and European Union. They use a panel data analysis to 
disentangle the time-invariant country specific effects and to capture the relationships 
between the relevant variables over time. The time period under study goes from 1988 to 
1996. They found that the fixed effect model is preferred over the random effect model. As a 
result, it was discovered that belonging to one of the two regional trade area fosters trade. 
 
4.2 Empirical Studies on Trade Liberalization in Emerging Economies  
 
Emerging economies have not been the subject for many studies, which is surprising because 
of their importance in the world economy. Existing empirical studies have examined either 
the integration of these countries with the rest of the world, global trade potential or the 
general RTA-effect. The use of gravity model is common for these studies.  
Mun Heng and Gayathri (2004) study how the regional trade agreements would influence on 
emerging countries by using Vietnam as an example country. The study provides an appraisal 
of Vietnam’s regionalist integration strategy of trade liberalization. Mun Heng and Gayathri 
(2004) simulate four different RTA scenarios and study the effects of each among others on 
international trade and economic growth. They simulate Vietnam’s possibility to join the 
ASEAN free trade area, the ASEAN-China free trade agreement, and the ASEAN-Japan free 
trade agreement. By using a method of computable general equilibrium (CGE) model they 
explore and quantify the economic benefits and losses resulting from the participation of 
Vietnam in regional trade agreements. CGE has been used widely to study the changes in 
trade policy such as regional trade agreements. The advantage of this method is its ability to 
take into the consideration the economic interdepency among multiple sectors and multiple 
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trading partners in measuring the quantitative impact of policy changes. They found out that 
further trade liberalization beyond AFTA would benefit Vietnam in terms of welfare and 
trade. Trade liberalization could bring better economic advantage and lower adjustment costs 
for Vietnam’s efforts at industrialization and fostering structural economic change in all the 
scenarios. 
The role of China in the world economy has been studied and the integration with the rest of 
the world. In the study, Bussiére and Schnatz (2006, 99-100) measure the intensity in a new 
way by including many more factors than traditional openness ratios to trade integration. As 
indicators they use the share of certain countries in China’s trade, the share of China’s trade 
of the trade of certain countries, China’s trade flows by trading partners, the openness ratio 
(Trade/GDP), the share of China in world trade and trade concentration. They try to present 
an empirical assessment of China’s natural place in the world economy by using a gravity 
model for the period 1980-2003. Differently from other studies Bussiére and Schnatz aim to 
develop a new set of trade integration indicators instead of studying only the effect of policy 
variables such as regional trade integration. They estimate the model with a two-step panel 
framework, which takes country heterogeneity properly into consideration. According to the 
study China is already well integrated into the world markets, especially with North America, 
several Latin American and East Asian emerging markets and most euro area countries. 
Tianshu Liu (2007) studied the impact of regional trade agreements on China’s trade during 
the time period 1980-2004. The studied regional trade agreements were ASEAN, CER, 
CUSTFA,  NAFTA,  MERCOSUR,  EU  and  APEC.  Liu  adds  in  the  study  to  the  gravity  
equation three RTA variables to be able to capture the influences on intraregional trade (trade 
creation), extra regional trade (trade diversion) and outside regional trade. Outside regional 
trade means that non-members have possibility to find other solutions to enlarge their trade 
and to reduce the negative impact of the RTA. Liu found that China’s formation of regional 
trade agreements has had both negative and positive influences on China’s trade with other 
trading partners, when they are not members of a bloc. China’s membership in APEC 
improves China’s trade with other members. Instead, trade diversion is found with CER, 
NAFTA, CUSTFA, and MERCOSUR. However, ASEAN does not slow down its members’ 
trade with China. The influence of EU on China’s imports is not obvious in this research. The 
R-square in the study ranged from 0.8880 to 0.9517 reflecting the strong fit of the gravity 
model. 
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Amitra Batra (2004) studied India’s global trade potential using the gravity model approach. 
In the study, an augmented gravity model equation is used with the maximum possible 
geographical coverage of world trade flows. The study consists of two parts. In the first part, 
the gravity model is used to analyze the world trade flows and the impact of RTAs on trade 
flows using the OLS technique. Thus the coefficients obtained from the estimation are used to 
predict the trade potential of India in the second part. This is done by keeping in mind the 
prospective preferential trade agreements that are in offering in the near future or have already 
been established. Especially the trade potential is studied with SAARC, ASEAN and GCC. 
The cross-section data is for the year 2000. As a dependent variable total merchandise trade 
flows is used. Batra (2004)  found out that the coefficient for regional trade agreements is 
0.87 meaning that RTAs can lead the trade to increase over twice as much as it would be 
otherwise possible for a country pair. However, in the second part the trade potential of India 
is considered the highest with the Asia-Pacific region followed by Western Europe and North 
America.  
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5 Gravity Model and Methodology 
 
This  part  of  the  thesis  concentrates  on  explaining  the  gravity  model  that  is  used  in  the  
empirical part. First, the aim is to explain what gravity model is and to which theories it is 
based on. Second, the instrumental variable method is talked through. The instrumental 
variable method has recently become a popular method because in the model it is assumed the 
regional trade agreements to be endogeneous as in Ornelas (2005b) theory. 
 
5.1 Gravity Model 
 
Modeling and predicting foreign trade flows has long been an essential task in international 
economics (Mátyás 1997 363). Normally, the gravity model is used to explain cross-sectional 
variation in country pairs’ trade flows. (Baier & Bergstrand 2007, 73.) Gravity model has also 
used to understand the determinants of bilateral trade flows across countries and later on it has 
been used to analyze commercial policy measures (Sanso, Cuairan & Sanz 1993, 266). The 
positive correlation between the level and similarity of GDP and bilateral trade flows based 
on the macroeconomic theory has also been found in the previous research (Wang, Wei & Liu 
2010, 898). The general view is that the higher the levels of GDP and the lower the 
transaction costs, which are usually measured as bilateral distance, the higher the trade flows 
between trade partners. The gravity model has been used to both cross section and panel data 
estimation. Jan Tinbergen (1962) and Pentti Pöyhönen (1963) were the first researchers who 
published econometric studies using the gravity model for international trade flows in the 
early 1960s. In his study, Tinbergen evaluated the effects of the free trade area on trade flows. 
In the beginning, the model was based on Newton’s Laws of Gravitation and it was stated that 
the gravity equation was without theoretical foundation. However, later it has been derived 
from the international trade theories including Richardian-, Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O)-, and 
increasing returns to scale (IRS) models.19 The  derivation  of  the  gravity  model  from  the  
framework where firms in monopolistic competition maximize profits is briefly reviewed in 
the next chapter as all international trade theories end up to the same gravity model. 
                                               
19 See Evenett and Keller (2002),  
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A  common  way  to  use  the  gravity  model  is  to  divide  the  countries  into  pairs,  then  form  a  
sample of their yearly trade data and last estimate the gravity equation on the formed sample. 
In the original form of gravity model, there are only two core variables (Wang, Weng & Liu 
2010, 894). Later, the model was extended and explanatory variables such as geographical 
variables and language were added. Various researchers have extended the original model by 
adding variables such as border effects, historical or colonial ties, exchange rate or currency 
risk, trade or economic policy, economic development and other dummy variables such as 
language20. 
The gravity equation is equally applicable to any pair of countries and it has symmetric 
character which means that it provides the trade flows in both directions by changing the 
variables of country i for country j (Sanso, Cuairan & Sanz 1993, 267). One difficulty in 
estimating the gravity equation is that the trade variable becomes undefined if bilateral trade 
flows are zero. As a result presented in this thesis, the country pairs with zero bilateral trade 
are dropped from the analysis following Frankel (1997) and Magee (2003). Another option 
would be to use all country pairs and put ???????? =  0  when there  are  no  bilateral  flows.  In  
addition, with the Tobit estimation method the possible bias of the latter method could be 
avoided. 
Currently, there is a wide consensus about some characteristics of the gravity model. At both, 
empirical and theoretical levels, it is agreed about the great usefulness of gravity models basic 
formulation as an instrument for bilateral trade flows’ modeling and its adequacy to each 
particular situation by adding the suitable variables. In addition, it is agreed that the log linear 
form is the correct specification for it. (Sanso, Cuairan & Sanz 1993, 266.) In this thesis I 
agree with these characteristics. There has also been some criticism about the model. Polak 
(1996) in his study has criticized the significant role of regional trade agreements in 
explaining the volume of exports. 
The success of gravity model to be the dominant empirical method of analyzing bilateral trade 
flows is in the model’s strong explanatory power. In their study, Baier and Bergstrand (2007, 
77) have concluded that the gravity model’s explanatory power ???) has ranged from 60-
80 %. Therefore, the model is particularly fitting since it focuses on barriers to trade. (Melitz 
                                               
20 See: Frankel & Rose, 2002; de Groot, Linders, Rietweld & Subramanian, 2004; ‘’’, 2004; Melitz, 2008; 
Frankel & Wei, 1993; Longo & Sekkat, 2004; Baier & Bergstrand, 2009 
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2008, 674.) The advantages of the gravity model are also, that the model has been exclusive 
in similar research. 
 
5.1.1 The Gravity Model Framework 
 
The derivation of gravity equation from different international trade theories is very general. 
In this thesis, the generalized gravity model is derived from the framework where firms in 
monopolistic competition maximize profits and consumers maximize utility according to the 
Dixit-Stiglitz preferences of international trade theory as shown by Carrère (2006, 225). As it 
has already been mentioned in the previous chapter, all international trade theories end up to 
the same gravity model. Therefore, the Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) -model among others can also 
generate gravity equation represented below. 
Let’s assume that the profit maximizing firms in country j set the product prices delivered to i 
according to the equation (1) (1)??????????????????? ? ????? 
In the equation (1), ??? is a barrier to trade function between i and j to be developed later in 
this chapter.  
Then we obtain the following equilibrium trade flow for each goods-producing firm in 
country j selling to market i: 
(2)???????????????? = ? ??(1? ?)? ??????? ???????? ???? ??????1 + ?? ?)?1 + ??????? 
Equation (2) is the currently accepted theoretical foundation for the gravity equation in the 
presence of transportation costs and tariffs. In the equation: 
???? = the value of aggregate trade flow imported by country i from exporter j; 
? = the elasticity of substitution in consumption in goods (Dixit-Stiglitz preferences); 
? = the Cobb-Douglas preference parameter for goods; 
? = fixed costs facing each firm (including both capital and labour); Y???) = gross domestic product of country i(j); 
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p? = exporter (country j) price level of it representative good; 
?? = share of tariff revenue relative to income; 
??? = ad-valorem tariff-rate by country i on the good produced in j (??? = 0 assumed) 
 
To be able to derivate the gravity equation the multilateral resistance term is needed. The 
multilateral resistance term can be interpreted as an output-weighted measure of the 
remoteness in terms of the trade costs of country i. (Carrère 2006, 226.) 
(3)????????????? = ? ??[?????(1 + ???)]????
???
???
?????
 
If it is assumed that ad valorem tariff of country i on the good produced in j is equal to an ad 
valorem tariff  of  country  j  on  the  good produced  in  i  (??? ? ???) and the barriers to trade be 
equal ??? ? ??? the implicit solution to equations (1) and (3) is: 
(4)???????????? = ??????? ? ???? 
When we substitute equation (4) into equation (2), we get equation (5): 
(5)????????????? = ? ??(1? ?)? 1??? ??????????? ?????1 + ??????????????? 
This equation is remarkably close to the gravity model in the empirical literature. In the 
equation ? ?
?????)? ???? is later in the equation (7) absorbed to be constant term. Regarding to a 
barrier to trade, ???,  it  is  obvious  that  it  is  crucial  to  get  the  best  handle  possible  on  what  
constitutes the “barrier-to-trade” function, which is usually proxied either by distance between 
trading partners or sometimes with a price ratio. Because recent studies have shown that these 
variables are not the only determinants of trade costs, I model the barrier-to-trade function 
between countries i and j, as follows:  
(6)????????? ?? ? = ??????????????????? ???????? ???????? 
In the equation above,?????? is the geographical distance of the countries i and j and ?????? 
express whether countries i and j are neighbor countries and share a border. In addition, 
Carrère (2006, 227) used in the barrier-to-trade function two other dummy variables: country i 
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is landlocked and country j is landlocked. I replaced landlocked variables with the following 
variables as it can be noticed from the equation (6) above: ?????  express whether both of the 
pair countries are categorized as developing countries and ????? is the regional trade 
agreement variable, which reveals whether the countries i and j belong to the same trading 
bloc. In this study, all the variables in the gravity model refer to those values in the given 
year, except dummy variables that are time invariant. 
Next the equation (6) is substituted to the equation (5) and after some modifications the 
following gravity model equation is got: (7)???????????? ? ?? ? ????????? ? ??????? ????????? ?????????? ????????????
? ?????????? ? ??? ???????????????????????????????????????? 
In the equation ???? ? ????? ? ????? and ?????? are  the  same  as  in  the  equation  (6).  In  the  
equation (7) above, ????? is the volume of trade from country i to country j at time t. In the 
existing literature, there is no agreement on whether the dependent variable should be exports 
or total trade (i.e. the total sum of export and imports) (Wang, Wei & Liu 2010, 904). ?? is a 
coefficient, ?????? is the GDP in country i at time t, ????? is the same for country j. 
In this thesis, I use this derived form for the gravity equation and I add to the equation (7) 
some necessary variables to my estimation. According to Wang et al. (2010, 895) in the 
literature it is not mentioned which other variables should be included in the extended model. 
In this study, the variables added follow economic theories, previous studies, and variables 
that are necessary for the study. However, there is a universal inclusion of the gravity 
variables and according to Baxter and Kouparitsas (2005 p. 4), the reason for this is the 
willingness to determine the variables that can explain the trade. 
For instance, I add to the model the population of the country i at time t (?????) and the same 
for country j at time t (?????). The logarithm is not taken from the dummy variables. To be 
able to capture possible trade diversion and creation effects in the first section of the empirical 
part, I use Urata’s and Okabe’s (2007) way. I add one more RTA variable,??????????????, 
in the estimation equation.21 After adding the necessary variables to the model, the gravity 
equation takes the form: 
                                               
21 Urata and Okabe (2007) actually added two RTA-variables. They studied two trade diversion effects: how the 
trade flows have changed from member of RTA to non-member and from non-member to member of RTA. 
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(8)???????????? ? ?? ? ????? ??? ? ??????? ???????????? ? ?????????? ? ??????????
?????????????? ? ????????????????? ? ??? ?????? ? ??? ?????? 
In the equation (8), ?????? ?????? ?????, ?????, ?????, ????? and ????? are the same as in the 
equation (7). The ? ?????? variable includes possible dummies added to the equation such 
as common border and developing country. In addition there is a variable, RTA/Diversionij, 
that measures the change in trade flows if one country is a member of RTA, but the other is 
not. With the latter variable, the trade diversion effect is tried to capture. (Urata & Okabe 
2007.) Variables capture the degree of trade diversion from non-members compared with 
normal bilateral trade (Lee & Shin 2006). 
By using the equation (8) above, I am trying to discover the influences of RTA on 
international trade flows. First, the general trade creation and trade diversion effects are 
examined in general without considering any specific RTAs such as ASEAN or Mercosur. In 
this case, the RTA-variable is also instrumented by using IV-method that is explained later in 
Chapter 5.2.1. Second, the effects of specific RTA on bilateral trade are studied. This means 
that I will also separate what happened as a consequence of each RTA that BICs have formed; 
which RTAs were trade creating and which were trade diverting.  
In this thesis, I will also study the impact of member country characteristics on trade diversion 
and to trade creation in the second section of the empirical part. In total I will construct 16 
new variables that will capture the effects of country characteristics. This approach was 
utilized in the study of Lee and Shin (2006) on trade creation and trade diversion in the East 
Asia. They found evidence that countries located in close proximity and sharing a land border 
tend to create more trade and divert less trade. The next six new variables are the same as in 
the study of Lee and Shin (2006). First, I will construct a variable (RTA_Distance) that 
interacts the bilateral distance between country (i, j) with the intra-bloc dummy 
(RTA/Creation) to study the effect of distance between member countries on trade creation. 
Second, variables that interact the border and intra-bloc dummy (RTA_Border) and language 
and intra-bloc dummy (RTA_Language) are also created. The same is done for the extra-bloc 
dummies and three more variables are created: RTAD_Distance, RTAD_Border, 
RTA_Language. In addition, I decided to add ten other variables to study the impact of some 
other member country characteristics on both trade diversion and trade creation more 
precisely. Five new variables for both trade diversion and trade creation are created as above. 
The country characteristics used in the new variables are: common religion, common ex-
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colonizer, common legal origin, common continent and both countries being developing 
countries. 
 
5.2 Methodology 
 
The  aim  of  this  thesis  is  to  study  whether  the  regional  trade  agreements  create  trade.  To  
achieve this, the instrumental variable estimation is used in the gravity model. This section 
describes how the regional trade agreement is instrumented and when the method is used. 
 
5.2.1 Instrumental variable method 
 
In the empirical part of the thesis, the instrumental variable (IV) estimation is used. According 
to Dougherty (2007, 252), IV is a major variation on OLS. In IV, the purpose is to semi-
replace a defective explanatory variable with another variable that is not correlating with the 
disturbance term. (Dougherty 2007, 252.) As mentioned in the previous chapter the regional 
trade area dummy is semi-replaced in this thesis with the cultural variables.  
In the simple IV regression, the simple OLS equation is used: 
?? ? ?? ?????? ? ?? 
From the equation above, the variable ?? is instrumented with Z. To be a good instrument Z 
(cultural variables) should be correlating with ?? (RTA), but not with the error term ??. In this 
case, many instruments are used meaning that all of them have to correlate highly with the 
instrumented variable. 
In addition, all the four instruments should influence on the likelihood a RTA will be signed 
as it was discovered in Chapter 4.5, but not directly influence bilateral trade levels. Therefore 
they are not direct determinants of bilateral trade. Though, the cultural variables do not 
completely fulfill the second requirement for the good instrument. For examples Melitz 
(2008) and Magee (2003) have important results related to this topic. Both Melitz (2008) and 
Magee (2003, 15) found that a common language promotes bilateral trade, which is against 
the second requirement of the good instrument. Still, many researchers such as Guiso, 
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Sapienza and Zingales (2009) have used cultural variables as instruments when trying to find 
out the influence of certain variable on trade.22 Therefore, I will do it as well. Though, my aim 
is to do the IV-estimation two ways. First, include language in instruments and then exclude 
the language from the instruments to see if the language really has direct impact on trade. 
It is possible to use each factor separately. However, the IV estimation becomes more 
efficient if all the instruments are used as a group rather than individually. To do this, all of 
them have to be included in the list of instruments in the regression command as it is done in 
this thesis. According to Verbeek (2001, 150), in the IV-estimation it is possible to use from 
one to arbitrary number of instruments. The asymptotic efficiency is positively correlated 
with the number of instruments. However, the finite sample bias increases with the amount of 
instruments. (Johnston & DiNardo 1997, 157.) 
The most important thing in IV-estimation it is to choose instruments that meet the 
requirements of a good instrument. The requirements for good instruments are; the instrument 
should correlate with the variable and not to correlate with the variable’s error term. 
There is some criticism for the IV-method. Baier and Bergstrand (2007, 83) agree that the IV-
method is not reliable for addressing endogeneity bias of the RTA binary variable in a gravity 
equation. 
  
                                               
22 Guiso et al. (2009) studied the influence of trust on trade flows and they used cultural variables as instruments 
for trust. Though the instrumented variable is not regional trade agreement in the study of Guiso et al. (2009), the 
influence of cultural variables on trade is commensurate to my study. 
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6 Data and Variables 
 
6.1 Formulating and description of the data 
 
This chapter describes the panel data used in this thesis. The panel data consists of country 
pairs and years in the estimation. The dataset  consists of 4744 country pairs over the period 
2001-2008. BIC-countries (Brazil, India and China) are the target countries. See Country 
Table 9 for the full list of countries included in the study. Some of the country pairs were 
dropped because of the missing values. 
During the crisis BIC countries were active at using protectionist measures and also the 
growth of the world was negative. Only China among some other countries gained positive 
growth. Therefore it is better to use the data only until 2008 to avoid the deviations caused by 
the financial crisis. 
In addition, to the general gravity model variables, such as trade flows, distance and language, 
the challenge was to find instruments for the regional trade area to decrease the bias of the 
estimation. Differently from most of the previous studies the regional trade area variable is 
instrumented. The cultural variables (language, religion, legal system, common ex-colonizer) 
are used as instruments for regional trade area. 
The data is collected from many sources. The main sources of the data are the CEIC and 
French CEPII Database, which are supplemented with data from other databases. CEPII 
Gravity Dataset is originally collected by Keith Head, Thierry Mayer and John Ries. The data 
for bilateral trade flows is found the CEIC which is a database for emerging and developed 
markets. The data of the instrumental variables is got from diverse sources. The data was 
collected as the currency of the United States and deflated in the prices of the year 2005. 
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6.2 Variables 
6.2.1 Time variant variables 
 
Trade Flow 
In  this  thesis,  the  bilateral  trade  flow  is  the  dependent  variable  that  expresses  the  trade  
between the countries i and j. In period t the trade flow (TF) is determined as follows: 
????? = ln????? ??????? 
In the equation above, ????  represent exports from reporting country i to country j in period t, 
and ???? represents  the  imports  from country  j  to  reporting  country  i  (Baxter  & Kouparitsas  
2005, 3). Therefore, ????? is the sum of exports. The data for bilateral trade flows is collected 
from the CEIC database.  
GDP 
GDP is one of the core variables in the gravity model. The levels of countries GDP’s should 
positively affect influence on their bilateral trade. (Wang, Wei & Liu 2010, 895-898.) GDPs 
are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) database. 
Population 
Population is one of the common variables used in the gravity model. Population data is got 
from the World Bank’s WDI database. 
Trade Diversion 
The trade diversion variable is formulated in a new way in this thesis. This Michaely index 
measures to what extent the importing profile of a country is matched by the exporting profile 
of another country or group of countries. The index is developed by Michaely (1996). This 
index has been used among others by Aurora Mordonu (2006) and Otsubo and Umemura 
(1998).23 The use of an index provides several advantages over the use of dummy variable. In 
a case of a high match, it is expected that the bilateral trade increases when they become 
members of the same bloc. The closer the value is to 1, the more exact the match is and a little 
                                               
23 Aurora Mordonu (2006) studied in her study the exports of Russia. The index describes to what extent the 
exports structure of Russia matches the structure of the partner’s country’s demand for imports. The same index 
was also used by Otsubo and Umemura (1998). Though they used the Michaely index as a measure for trade 
complementary in the gravity equation. 
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trade diversion can be expected. The closer the value is to 0, the more trade diversion can be 
expected. In period t, the index is determined as: 
????? = 1 ? ??m?? ? x???2  
Where i is the reporting country (Brazil, India, China), j is the partner country, k is a good in a 
category, m is the share of the exports of product k in a country’s in-category imports from 
the world and x is the share of the exports of product k in the country’s in category exports to 
the world. After the indices are calculated per category, the indices are aggregated per 
importing country, using weighted averages. The weights are the shares of the partner 
country’s category imports in partner country’s total imports. (Mordonu 2006, 16.) The data is 
got from the UN Comtrade database.  
 
6.2.2 Time invariant variables 
 
Membership to a regional trade agreement 
The membership to a regional trade agreement is a dummy variable. If two countries have 
joined the same trading bloc before or during the sample period 2001-2008, the dummy 
variable RTA gets value 1. If they are not members of the same trading bloc, the dummy 
variable gets value 0. This method of determining the RTA variable has been used by 
Caporale et al. (2008, p. 17) among others. Some researchers have determined RTA as a time 
variant variable24. Both methods may cause a biased variable, because there is the chicken-
egg problem that was mentioned in the literature review chapter. 
The general RTA variable consists of six RTAs and 13 bilateral trade agreements, which are 
notified to the GATT and the WTO up to December 2008. Of 13 bilateral agreements in two 
of the agreements, the other party is RTA.  
Developing country 
This variable gets value 1, if both trading partners are categorized to be developing countries. 
In other cases the dummy variable gets value 0. The data is got from the IMF database. 
                                               
24 See Urata & Okabe (2007); Magee (2004) 
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Transaction costs 
In this thesis, the weighted distance is used as proxy for transaction costs. The distance is 
assumed to reduce trade because the transaction costs are assumed to increase with the 
distance. The idea in formulating the distance is to calculate the distance between two 
countries based on the bilateral distance between the largest cities in two partner countries. 
The inter-city distances are weighted by the share of the city in the overall country’s 
population. In their note Mayer and Zignago (2006) use Head’s and Mayer’s formula for the 
calculation of the weighted distance between countries i and j. 
??? = (?(?????????)?
???
???????????????
?)?
???
???
 
In the equation, pop? is  the  population  of  agglomeration  k  belonging  to  country  i.  The  
parameter ? measures  the  sensitivity  of  trade  flows  to  bilateral  distance  ???. In the distance 
calculation ? is set to be 1. The data is got from the CEPII database. 
 
Share a border 
If two countries share a border, this variable gets value 1. If they are not neighbor countries 
sharing a border, this dummy variable gets value 0. Sharing a border is assumed to increase 
trade, because if countries do not have a common border there may be higher costs in trading 
with each other (Bussière & Schnatz 2006, 13). The data provided by Author. 
 
6.2.3 Instrumental variables  
 
In the empirical part, I apply the IV-method explained in the previous chapter, where the 
dummy variable RTA is instrumented. As instruments, the cultural factors are used though 
cultural variables do not fulfill the other condition for instruments as Melitz (2008, 15) finds 
that language has direct effect on trade. In the chapter about the characteristics of the trading 
partners, the explanation for the use was gone through.  
The most challenging in the IV-estimation is to find proper instruments. The minimum 
number of instruments is one. Next, the formation of four chosen instruments, language, 
religion, legal system, common ex-colonizer, is explained. The instruments were chosen so 
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that these dimensions of culture may have influence on economic outcomes. Also the above 
mentioned four instruments have been used in recent research about culture. 
Common ex-colonizer 
The first variable used as an instrument is common ex-colonizer. The variable is determined 
so that the variable gets value 1 if countries have had a common colonizer after 1945. The 
colonizer variable is got from the CEPII database. 
Language 
The second instrument is language, which reflects various aspects of culture (Melitz 2008, 
692). According to Bussière and Schnatz (2006, 13) countries that share the same language 
have lower transaction costs to trade. Also those countries tend to historically have more 
established trade ties. The language variable is got from the CEPII dataset. As a dummy 
variable language gets the value 1 if the countries share the same language; otherwise the 
dummy variable gets value 0. 
Legal origin 
The third instrument is a legal system. The variable gets value 1 if countries have the same 
legal origin. Otherwise the variable gets value 0. The data is got from the Professor Andrei 
Shleifer’s database. He has categorized legal origins into British, French, socialist, German 
and Scandinavian. According to the database, the legal origin in Brazil is French, in China 
socialist and in India is British.  
Religion 
The fourth instrument, the religion, has been widely used as proxy for culture (Stulz & 
Williamson 2001). Therefore, it is considered a good instrument for regional trade area. In the 
data it is reported the major religions (over 20 % of the population) as well as religion groups 
to which 9 to 20% belong to. The data is got from CIA World Factbook. 
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6.3 Descriptive Analysis of the Data 
 
Figure 1 below presents the development of the total trade flows, trade flows among the RTA 
members and trade flows from RTA member to non-member. 
 
Figure 5 The Development of Trade Growth (Source: Author’s own calculations) 
 
As  it  is  possible  to  see  from Figure  1,  the  trade  flow among members  of  the  regional  trade  
agreement has increased slightly faster than the trade flow between members and non-
members. This reflects the fact that trade liberalization fosters the increase in trade. However, 
the increase in trade between members and non-members reveals that no obvious trade 
diversion exists.  
Before the empirical results are represented, the overall characteristics of the data are gone 
through. Table 1 below represents the characteristics of the whole dataset as well as sample 
that consist of countries belonging to a regional trade agreement and countries that may be a 
target for trade diversion. The data is divided into two groups by using the trade creation and 
diversion dummy variables. Of all observations, 952 country pairs (20 %) belong to regional 
trade agreements and 3792 country pairs (80 %) belong to the member-non-member 
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relationship. The comparison of the samples already reveals that there are some desirable 
characteristics that lead to more trade creation. 
Table 1: Summary Statistics (2001-2008)25 
     
  (1) All   (2) Trade Creation (3) Trade Diversion 
  (N=4744)   (N=952)   (N=3792)   
  Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev 
Year 2004.5 2.292 2004.5 2.292 2004.5 2.292 
Log of trade 4.671 3.086 6.109 2.313 4.294 3.151 
Log of distance 8.965 0.545 8.741 0.751 9.020 0.465 
Log of GDPi 7.461 0.809 7.428 0.886 7.469 0.788 
Log of GDPj 8.003 1.652 7.523 1.248 8.122 1.717 
Log of population i 20.280 0.873 20.145 0.885 20.315 0.867 
Log of population j 15.465 2.066 16.871 1.599 15.089 2.014 
Log of GDP in pairs 51.244 2.466 51.942 1.855 51.071 2.566 
Log of GDP per capita in pairs 1.435 0.066 1.406 0.056 1.442 0.067 
Common border dummy 0.056 0.277 0.168 0.374 0.028 0.239 
Continent 0.053 0.223 0.171 0.377 0.023 0.151 
Common language dummy 0.124 0.329 0.128 0.334 0.123 0.328 
Common ex-colonizer 0.100 0.300 0.128 0.334 0.093 0.291 
Common religion 0.166 0.402 0.254 0.553 0.143 0.351 
Common legal origin 0.292 0.455 0.378 0.485 0.270 0.444 
Developing country 0.717 0.451 0.924 0.265 0.665 0.472 
 
In Table 1 four important findings were found.26 First the logarithmic mean of trade in 
column (2) is a lot higher than in the columns (1) and (3), which indicates that bilateral trade 
between members of the regional trade agreement is significantly higher than the average 
bilateral trade in the whole sample or between members and non-members. However, the 
logarithmic mean of trade in columns (1) and (3) is comparable which is a sign of the 
similarity of the trade volume in the whole sample and trade between members and non-
members. On the basis of these figures it can be assumed that regional trade agreements in 
BIC-countries create more trade among members and do not divert trade from non-members. 
Second, regional trade agreements have been formed among relatively large countries in 
terms of economic size. The logarithmic mean of GDP in the pairs in column (2) is somewhat 
                                               
25 The summary statistics are based on bilateral variables for the whole sample (column 1), the members of the 
regional trade agreement sample (column 2), and the member-non-member of the regional trade agreement 
sample (column 3) 
26 Similar findings were also noted among others Lee and Shin (2005), while their sample consisted of 175 
countries from 1948-1999. 
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larger than in columns (1) and (3). This implies that regional trade agreements have been 
formed  among  economically  significant  countries  to  which  BIC-countries  with  their  
enormous growth rates belong to. This is confirmed with the column (3), where the 
logarithmic mean of GDP in the country pairs is much lower than in the column (2). 
Interestingly the logarithmic mean of per capita GDP in the pairs in column (2) is much lower 
than in the columns (1) or (3). Therefore regional trade agreements have been formed among 
relatively poorer countries, which indicate the fact that BIC-countries are still categorized as 
developing countries based on their per capita GDP as it was discovered in the introduction of 
this thesis. Also the developing country dummy is much larger in the column (2) suggesting 
that if both of the countries are developing countries it is more likely that they form regional 
trade agreement. 
Third, the members of the regional trade agreements seem to have specific geographical 
characteristics. The logarithmic mean of distance is shorter in column (2) than in column (1). 
Instead the logarithmic mean of distance is significantly larger in column (3) than columns (1) 
and (2). Also member countries in column (2) are more likely to share a common land border 
or be located on the same continent. While in the column (3) border dummy and continent 
dummy get much lower values than in the columns (1) and (2). These characteristics suggest 
that there should be some specific country characteristics that naturally lead to regional trade 
integration. Countries that are close at distance, share a border or are in the same continent 
form more probable regional trade agreements. 
Fourth, the members of the specific regional trade agreement seem to have specific cultural 
characteristics. The mean of dummy variables common language, common ex-colonizer, 
common religion and common legal origin are significantly larger in column (2) than in 
column (1) and (3). These characteristics suggest that countries with similar cultural roots are 
more likely to establish regional trade agreements. Instead, the values of these variables in 
column (3) suggest that the more different the cultural roots of the variables are the more 
likely it is that trade diversion will occur. 
The interpretations above made about the BIC-countries and their trading partners are only 
suggestive. Before the influences of specific characteristics on trade creation and diversion is 
researched more closely, the results of the investigation, how the regional trade agreements of 
the BIC-countries have in general influenced on trade flows, are studied. Also, the trade 
creation and diversion impacts are studied for specific regional trade agreements. 
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7 Empirical results 
 
This chapter will first present the estimation results of the influence of the regional trade 
agreements on trade in the emerging economies over the period 2001-2008. In my analysis, I 
use ordinary least squares regression and instrumental variable method. My analysis is 
twofold.  First,  I  study  what  kind  of  influence  the  regional  trade  agreements  have  on  trade,  
both among members and between members and non-members as well as the trade effects of 
specific regional trade agreements. Second, I interpret the member country characteristics that 
may  influence  on  trade  diversion  and  creation.  The  final  part  of  this  chapter  will  draw  
conclusions based on the results and some additional tests and discuss their implications. 
In Chapter 3, I analyzed the impacts of the trade liberalization on trade with two theories. My 
results are mostly in line with the theories. However, the influence of RTA on non-members 
(trade diversion) is larger than expected. For this reason I have aimed to find possible 
explanations for this result. The dissection of the trade diversion variable gives potential 
solutions. 
 
7.1 The General Impact of Regional Trade Agreements 
 
I applied ordinary least squares (OLS) method to estimate the equation (8) for all country 
pairs  for  benchmark  result  (See  Chapter  5.1.1).  In  all  the  OLS  estimations  the  estimated  
coefficients of the standard set of variables that have generally been used in the gravity 
models, are statistically significant and the signs are in line with the model predictions as it is 
possible to observe from Table 2 below. Therefore, the amount of bilateral trade is promoted 
by the economic size (GDP), population size, and the development level of the countries and 
cultural similarities of the countries involved. However, the bilateral trade is reduced by the 
transportation costs measured by distance, common border, and the same continent of the 
countries. The estimated coefficient for log of distance implies that 1 percentage point 
increase in bilateral distance turns out to decrease bilateral trade by 89 percentage point (see 
Column 1, Table 2). The effect of distance is slightly smaller than in previous studies (see e.g. 
Urata & Okabe 2007; Baier & Bergstrand 2007). The estimated coefficients of common 
language of the countries involved are shown to change remarkably as the determinants of the 
gravity equation change. The coefficient of the language loses its significance the smaller the 
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coefficient for language becomes. The countries that have common language trade 
approximately 34 percent more than countries without common language. However, 
differently from many previous studies ex-common colonizer and common land border are 
not significant (See Hellvin & Nilsson, 2000; Urata & Okabe, 2007). A large part of the 
variation in the bilateral trade flows can be explained by the factors appealing in the original 
gravity model. Though, the impact of each determinant varies a bit between the models (1)-
(8) as the Table 2 below depicts. 
 
Table 2 The Influence of RTA on Trade  
 
 
Concerning the estimated coefficients of the general RTA effect, the estimated coefficients of 
the RTA dummy variable reveal that RTAs increase bilateral trade in almost all cases. This is 
an expected result that is in line with the theory of regional integration which states that the 
membership of the RTA enhances bilateral trade between the member countries (see Ornelas, 
2005b; Krishna 1998). Even though the estimated RTA-coefficients from the IV-estimation 
tend to have upward bias, the coefficients of both OLS and IV-estimation are statistically 
significant  (See  Table  2,  Column  2).  Though,  in  IV-estimation  the  coefficient  of  the  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 OLS IV OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Log of distance -0.886*** 
(0.10) 
-0.428 
(0.36) 
-0.866*** 
(0.11) 
-0.888*** 
(0.10) 
-0.926*** 
(0.10) 
-0.901*** 
(0.11) 
-0.913*** 
(0.10) 
-0.882*** 
(0.10) 
-0.861*** 
(0.11) 
Log of GDPi 1.106*** 
(0.03) 
1.119*** 
(0.04) 
1.104*** 
(0.03) 
1.111*** 
(0.03) 
1.076*** 
(0.04) 
1.075*** 
(0.04) 
1.080*** 
(0.04) 
1.070*** 
(0.04) 
1.072*** 
(0.04) 
Log of GDPj 0.840*** 
(0.03) 
0.814*** 
(0.04) 
0.841*** 
(0.03) 
0.840*** 
(0.03) 
0.891*** 
(0.03) 
0.892*** 
(0.03) 
0.889*** 
(0.03) 
0.895*** 
(0.03) 
0.893*** 
(0.03) 
Log of population i 0.375*** 
(0.06) 
0.568*** 
(0.15) 
0.376*** 
(0.06) 
0.350*** 
(0.06) 
0.350*** 
(0.06) 
0.351*** 
(0.06) 
0.341*** 
(0.06) 
0.392*** 
(0.06) 
0.385*** 
(0.07) 
Log of population j 0.136*** 
(0.04) 
-0.0313 
(0.16) 
0.135*** 
(0.04) 
0.144*** 
(0.04) 
0.121*** 
(0.04) 
0.120*** 
(0.04) 
0.127*** 
(0.04) 
0.119*** 
(0.04) 
0.121*** 
(0.04) 
RTA/Creation 0.566*** 
(0.14) 
4.004 
(2.18) 
0.553*** 
(0.15) 
0.543*** 
(0.14) 
0.358* 
(0.15) 
0.347* 
(0.15) 
0.353* 
(0.15) 
0.342* 
(0.15) 
0.334* 
(0.15) 
Log of RTA/Diversion -15.15*** 
(2.78) 
-13.69*** 
(2.88) 
-15.08*** 
(2.78) 
-14.92*** 
(2.78) 
-14.59*** 
(2.77) 
-14.46*** 
(2.78) 
-14.60*** 
(2.77) 
-14.55*** 
(2.77) 
-14.47*** 
(2.78) 
Common border  
 
 
 
0.126 
(0.27) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.0400 
(0.50) 
Common language  
 
 
 
 
 
0.344* 
(0.16) 
0.315* 
(0.16) 
0.319* 
(0.16) 
0.198 
(0.20) 
0.142 
(0.18) 
0.0906 
(0.21) 
Developing country  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.493*** 
(0.13) 
0.489*** 
(0.13) 
0.475*** 
(0.13) 
0.497*** 
(0.13) 
0.484*** 
(0.13) 
Continent  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.145 
(0.26) 
 
 
 
 
0.132 
(0.50) 
Common Ex-colonizer  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.221 
(0.23) 
 
 
0.123 
(0.23) 
Common legal origin  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.277* 
(0.12) 
0.259* 
(0.13) 
Constant -47.59*** 
(1.67) 
-53.42*** 
(4.18) 
-47.76*** 
(1.71) 
-47.37*** 
(1.66) 
-47.21*** 
(1.63) 
-47.42*** 
(1.67) 
-47.26*** 
(1.62) 
-48.39*** 
(1.71) 
-48.49*** 
(1.74) 
Observations 3699 3698 3699 3698 3698 3698 3698 3698 3698 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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RTA/Creation is significant only at 10 percent level.27 In the OLS-estimation, the estimated 
RTA-coefficient is 0.566 (see Column 1, Table 2), which indicates that the regional trade 
agreement results in 76 percent increase28 in trade between members. Therefore, there is a 
clear evidence that regional trade agreements have increased the trade among the BIC-
countries and their partner countries in RTAs during the time period 2001-2008. Compared to 
previous studies the influence is larger as in the study of Baier and Bergstrand (2002) the 
trade increased as a consequence of regional trade agreements only by 19 % when the OLS-
estimation was used.29 
 
First of all, a reason for this large influence of RTA on trade flows may be the other factors 
that have boosted the economy of these emerging economies. For example, during this time 
period the export led growth strategy may have supported the influence of RTAs on trade 
flows as Crawford and Fiorentino (2005, 2) among others suppose. As it is known, China is 
known of its export-led strategy and during the past 25 years China’s growth has mainly come 
from exports. By 2003, the exports already amounted to 60 % of GDP. (Koivu 2004, 4.) In 
addition, the large influence of RTAs on trade flows may be because of the 13 RTAs that 
were formed during the time period 2001-2008, 12 were bilateral agreements. Earlier the 
RTAs of BICs were mainly with neighbor countries and major trade partner countries. 
Therefore, as a consequence of the bilateral agreements, BIC-countries have become hub 
countries. This means that the regional trade agreements are likely to increase the trade flows 
of the hub countries (here Brazil,  China and India) remarkably and cause trade diversion to 
non-members as it was already reviewed in Chapter 2.5. However, the trade creation in the 
hub and spoke systems normally happens at the expense of other countries which in the trade 
liberalization means trade diversion. 
 
Therefore it is conceivable that trade diversion exists (Table 2). Definitely, it is no longer only 
the trade promotion that plays a significant role in the establishment of the RTAs. This is 
because  trade  creation  has  lost  its  first  position  in  the  establishment  of  RTAs  and  this  way  
trade diversion has become more probable outcome than before. More precisely, the 
motivation behind the establishment of RTAs in recent years has changed and become more 
political as Urata and Okabe (2007, 12) also suggest and what the theory of Krishna (1998) 
                                               
27 The Table 2 reports only significance levels that are smaller than 10 percent. However, the trade creation 
variable in IV-estimation is significant at 10 percent level as it is reported. 
28 (? exp(0.566) -1) 
29 See also studies Tadesse & White (2008), Magee (2003), Baier & Bergstrand (2007), Lee & Shin (2005) 
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suggests in Chapter 3.2. Therefore, also non-economic factors such as political factors have 
increasing importance in the establishment process which often leads to trade diversion as the 
results of the Table 2 also reveal. 
 
The role of the political factors in the establishment of RTAs is shown in the coefficient of the 
trade diversion variables. The estimate for RTA/Diversion is negative, but statistically 
significant (Table 2). The absolute value of the estimate of the RTA/Diversion coefficient is 
more than 20 times larger compared to trade creation variable, which reflects the fact that the 
member’s trade with non-members decreases significantly as a consequence of RTAs. 
Therefore, the regional trade agreements of the BIC-countries divert trade away from the rest 
of the world to the members of the regional trade agreements. However, the results related to 
the trade diversion should be taken with caution, since the proxy for the trade diversion may 
be biased as the largeness of the coefficient refers. However, the sign of the trade diversion 
coefficient is as it could have been expected from the trade liberalization theories. This means 
that in Krishna’s (1998) theory there is some trade diversion as RTAs are assumed to be 
exogenous as in the basic form of OLS. 
 
The influence of trade diversion is extremely large which is why it is interesting to take a 
closer look for the possible factors influencing on it. In all of the estimation results the trade 
diversion variable got significant but extremely large value. Normally the value of the 
coefficient has varied approximately between ?0.063-3.00? depending on the study, time 
period and country group where the dummy variable has been used (See Lee & Shin 2006; 
Urata & Okabe 2007). The reasons that may have led to this kind of unexpected result in this 
study are represented next. First, in this study instead of dummy variable for trade diversion a 
Michaely index explained in Chapter 6.2 was used. According to previous studies (see 
Mordonu 2006, 17), the index is the closer to value 1 the closer we are to the present. This is 
because the importing profiles of countries are better matched by the exporting profiles of 
countries  these  days.  The  reason  why this  influences  this  way in  the  thesis  is  the  relatively  
short time period compared to the studies where the index has performed more reliable 
results. However, the possibility to use dummy variable is limited in this study because of the 
data consists of three target countries (i) and their trade partners (j) and in this kind of dataset 
when the RTA-variable gets value 0, it means trade diversion. That is why an index was 
created in the first place to be a proxy for this trade diversion variable. 
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When the attention is paid to the estimated coefficients of the general RTA variable in the IV-
estimation, the results are parallel to OLS-estimation except some of the coefficients change 
remarkably including the coefficient of the trade creation (See Table 2, Column 2). The 
estimated coefficient for geographical distance is approximately only a half of the coefficient 
of the OLS while the estimated coefficient for log of population (i) increases from 0.38 to 
0.57. In addition the coefficient for log of population (j) decreases from 0.14 to 0.03 and the 
sign of the coefficient changes from positive to negative and not significant. The coefficient 
of trade diversion falls from 16 to 14. Compared to OLS models the GDPs have similar 
influence on trade. Though, the largest change, as it was assumed, is in the trade creation 
variable. In the presence of these variables, the general RTA effect increases from 0.566 to 
4.00 being significant only at 10 percent level while in the OLS-models the RTA variable was 
significant at 0.1 percent level. The trend of the general RTA variable is in line with the 
previous studies but the extent is extremely large compared to previous studies.30 According 
to IV-estimation the coefficient of the regional trade agreements is over six times larger 
compared to OLS-estimation while in the study of Baier and Bergstrand the coefficient in the 
IV-estimation is only four times larger than in the OLS-estimation. The second IV-estimation 
was done by excluding the language variable from the instruments. However, the estimation 
results were equal to the IV-estimation where the language was included. Because the results 
of OLS and IV -estimation methods vary remarkably, it is important to test later in this 
chapter with post-estimation tests the superiority of these methods. Before that more detailed 
analysis of the results will not be done. 
 
It is interesting to find out that the range of R-square is in line with the previous studies. The 
R-square (within) is around 59 % in the estimations above meaning that the regression line 
fits the observations relatively well. As mentioned earlier in Chapter 5.1 the gravity model’s 
explanatory power ???) has normally ranged from 60-80 %. Therefore, the explanatory 
power of these models is in line with the explanatory power of the earlier gravity model 
studies. Perhaps more accurate proxy for trade diversion would have increased the fit. A 
reason for a slightly low ???) coefficient is that there are other determinants, different from 
the  ones  that  are  normally  included  in  the  analysis,  which  should  have  been  investigated  as  
well. 
                                               
30 See Baier & Bergstrand (2002), Magee (2003) 
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7.1.1 Additional Tests 
 
So far, the results of the instrumental variable method presented in Table 2 have not been 
analyzed more profoundly. As discussed earlier in Chapter 6.2.3 there is reason to believe 
RTA to be endogenous. Also some of the earlier studies point to this direction. Therefore in 
this chapter I will first discuss how the instrumental variables fulfill necessary conditions. 
Second I will test the weakness of the instruments and compare the OLS and IV methods with 
the post-estimation tests. 
As discussed in the methodology chapter, there are two requirements for instruments. A 
correlation matrix below was calculated to observe how the chosen instrumental variables 
would fulfill the necessary conditions. First, it is possible to view from the Table 3 below that 
all the chosen cultural variables are positively correlated with the instrumented variable, 
RTA/Creation, but unfortunately the correlation seems to be low. The instrumental variables 
would be the better the closer the value is for the absolute value 1. Even though the 
instruments do not totally fulfill the first requirement for the good instrument, it might still be 
valuable to test the influence of RTA on trade by using IV-method. Therefore, I tested in 
Chapter 7.1 both the IV- and OLS methods and I will base my decision of an instrumental 
variable method on post-estimation tests. 
Table 3 Correlation between RTAs and the Chosen Instrumental Variables 
 
The second requirement that all the four instruments should influence on the likelihood a 
RTA will be signed but not directly influence bilateral trade levels was discussed already in 
Chapter 5.2.1. Though, there cultural variables do not completely fulfill the second 
requirement for the good instrument as cultural variables, especially language, may influence 
directly on trade (Melitz 2008, 15). 
Next the reliability of the IV-regression results is tested with Hausman specification test and 
reported the results of ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for a comparison. The 
Hausman test will help in the evaluation of the data and how the model corresponds to the 
data.  
Language Ex-colonizer Religion Legal origin
RTA/Creation 0.0116 0.0372 0.1201 0.0996
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Based on the first-stage regression only one of the instruments is individually significant 
because of the very high p-values. Because the first-stage regression reports only Chi-square, 
it is transformed into F-statistics to be able to test the joint significance of the instruments. 
The possibility of weak instruments is examined with the F-test of joint significance. To avoid 
the problem with weak instruments the coefficients of stage 1 regression should be jointly 
insignificant (F-stat > Fcrit). The reported Chi-square is 749. By dividing it with the degrees 
of freedom of the first stage, 10, the F-statistic gets the value 74.9. As the p-value is highly 
significant I know that the joint effect of the instrumental variables is significant as the 
instrumented RTA-variable also suggests. 
After  some estimations,  I  tested  with  the  Durbin-Wu-Hausman test  whether  IV or  OLS fits  
better in the estimation, because many econometrics tests have discussed this issue (Baum 
2006, 211). Normally the test is used in order to check the endogeneity that is commonly 
related to the regression models. The test statistic is based on the differences between all the 
OLS  and  IV  coefficients  and  the  test  has  a  chi-squared  distribution  and  the  degrees  of  
freedom  is  equal  to  the  number  of  instruments.  According  to  Hausman,  the  IV  estimator  b  
will  be  consistent  under  both  the  null  hypothesis  and  the  alternative.  The  OLS  estimator  B  
will be consistent and unbiased, and more efficient than the IV estimator under the null 
hypothesis, but it will be inconsistent if the null hypothesis is false. Under the null hypothesis, 
the test statistic has a chi-squared distribution with the degrees of freedom usually equal to the 
number of coefficients being compared. In this case, the chi-squared test statistic summarizing 
the differences in coefficients is 46.54 which is remarkably high. Therefore, it is higher than 
18.467, which is the critical value of chi-squared at the 0.1 percent significance level with 
four degrees of freedom. Thus the null hypothesis is rejected. Therefore in a case of four 
instruments  there  is  no  need  to  use  IV  method,  because  it  is  less  efficient  than  OLS.  In  
addition the fact that instruments did not totally fulfil the second requirement for a good 
instrument supports the use of OLS-method when analysing the results. However, when it 
was tested with Hausman test whether IV or OLS fits better in the estimation when the 
language was excluded from the instruments, interesting findings were found. In this case the 
chi-squared test statistic summarizing the differences in coefficients is 4.27 which is 
remarkably low compared to the former chi-square value. Because the chi-squre value is now 
lower than the critical value of chi-squared at 0.1 percent significance level with three degrees 
of freedom (16.27), the null hypothesis is not rejected. This means that IV-method is 
preferred over OLS-method in a case that language is not included in instruments. This 
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reveals that language obviously has direct influence on trade as Melitz (2008) and Magee 
(2003, 15) have found out. Though, the IV-method was preferred over OLS-method when 
language was excluded from the instruments, the OLS method is still used in the later parts of 
this thesis. Reasons for this are the mixed results of the Hausman tests when cultural variables 
were used as instruments, as well as the low correlation between RTA and instruments  (see 
Table 3) and the uncertainty of the causality of cultural variables and trade. 
 
7.2 The Influence of Specific RTA on Trade.  
 
The previous analysis examined the impacts of RTAs in general without considering the 
impact of any specific RTA such as MERCOSUR or SAFTA. This section of this thesis 
analyses the impacts of specific RTAs on bilateral trade. The analysis includes both the trade 
creation and diversion effects of the specific RTAs. To be able to capture possible trade 
diversion effect a variable that takes value 1 if one country belongs to RTA but the other does 
not is added to the equation. So, the Michaely index that was used to capture the general trade 
diversion effect in the previous chapter is no longer used in this part of the thesis. 
The estimation results are shown in Table 6. The standard variables of the gravity model such 
as GDP, population and distance have expected impacts with statistical significance. Though 
the influence of population i and population j is significantly higher than in the base 
estimation in Table 2 (column 1). 
The estimated coefficients for only some of the RTAs seem to be significantly positive. 
RTAs, for which positive and significant trade creation are found, are GSTP, China-Chile and 
China-Hong Kong. It is interesting to observe that for many RTAs neither the trade creation 
or diversion effect is identified. Specifically, the estimated coefficients on non-RTA dummy 
are negative and statistically significant for only RTAs LAIA, APTA, India-Afghanistan, 
India-Bhutan, ASEAN-China and China-Pakistan. The analysis reveals that there is no trade 
creation  in  APTA,  because  of  the  negative,  but  significant  coefficient  as  well  as  in  the  
regional trade agreement between China and Hong Kong no trade diversion occurs (Table 6). 
The analysis of the estimates of RTA country-pair dummies reveals interesting observations. 
First, the RTAs with positive coefficient (not necessarily significant) can be considered to 
include both natural trading partners, since they exhibit larger trade value compared to normal 
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or average levels  as well as other partner countries that are e.g. not located close at distance 
or are culturally different (Table 6). Specifically countries in SAFTA and most of the bilateral 
trade agreements can be considered to be natural trading partners according to the definition 
of Frankel (1997). Second, the wide range of different countries that promote trade creation 
supports the significant role of the natural trade partners in the establishment of RTAs as well 
as the motivation of the other countries for boosting trade via regional trade agreements. 
Third, the changing landscape of regional trade agreements, which among others means that 
trade creation is no longer the main target of the regional trade agreement. This means that 
instead of trade promotion, the political factors are strong in the decision making process and 
naturally as a consequence the bilateral trade flows increase as the tariffs are removed. This is 
partly proved by the increased number of bilateral trade agreements among countries not 
being natural trade partners and the changing role of distance between the trade partners. 
 
7.3 The Impact of Characteristics on Trade Creation and Diversion 
 
This part of the thesis examines eight characteristics of member countries that may have 
impact on trade creation or trade diversion. The interaction terms between intra- and extra-
bloc  RTA dummies  were  already  defined  at  the  end  of  Chapter  5.1.1.  As  RTA dummies,  I  
will use common border, common language and geographical distance as Lee and Shin (2006) 
did. In addition I use five additional dummies: common continent, common religion, common 
legal origin, and common ex-colonizer and if both countries are developing countries.  
In  general,  the  total  additional  trade  that  is  created  by  regional  trade  agreements  among  
common-border members is estimated by summing the coefficients of trade creation and the 
RTA-dummy for common border members. In this way it is possible to take into account the 
coefficient of trade creation of RTA members and that of common border which presents 
additional trade creation for member countries that share also common border. The same is 
done for other intra-bloc RTA dummies and also for the trade diversion -dummies. However, 
in the trade diversion the sum of coefficient of trade diversion and dummy for common 
border examines the trade diversion from non-member countries and additional trade 
diversion because of average number of common-border countries in the RTA. 
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Table 4 below reports the estimation results that include eight interaction terms and the intra-
bloc dummy variable. The first four estimated coefficients (GDPi, GDPj, population_i and 
population_j) are surprisingly similar across the columns. 
 
Table 4 The Effect of Characteristics on Trade Creation 
 
In column (1) the coefficients of the variables are similar compared to the baseline regression 
in column (1) in table (2). Surprisingly, the coefficient for the RTA/Creation has increased 
from 0.566 to 9.608. This is because the highly significant and negative interaction term, 
RTA_Distance (-1.010). This means that a 1 percentage point increase in the log of bilateral 
distance between RTA members leads to a 100 percent decline in trade creation. Also Lee and 
Shin (2006) had similar findings. When I use alternative measures for proximity, such as 
common border and continent the interaction terms are also positive and highly significant.  
The coefficients of column (2) suggest that trade creation between common border RTA 
members is more than 116 percent higher as that between members without common border. 
In a case of common continent, the trade creation between RTA members in the same 
continent 130 percent greater than that between members which are located in different 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Distance Border Continent Language Religion Legal 
origin 
Ex-colonizer Developing 
Log of GDPi 1.088*** 
(0.03) 
1.084*** 
(0.04) 
1.085*** 
(0.04) 
1.087*** 
(0.04) 
1.087*** 
(0.04) 
1.082*** 
(0.04) 
1.088*** 
(0.04) 
1.088*** 
(0.035) 
Log of GDPj 0.844*** 
(0.03) 
0.834*** 
(0.03) 
0.831*** 
(0.03) 
0.827*** 
(0.03) 
0.829*** 
(0.03) 
0.834*** 
(0.03) 
0.828*** 
(0.03) 
0.827*** 
(0.03) 
Log of population i 0.412*** 
(0.07) 
0.448*** 
(0.07) 
0.449*** 
(0.07) 
0.436*** 
(0.07) 
0.444*** 
(0.07) 
0.478*** 
(0.07) 
0.434*** 
(0.07) 
0.443*** 
(0.07) 
Log of population j 0.146*** 
(0.04) 
0.146*** 
(0.04) 
0.149*** 
(0.04) 
0.153*** 
(0.04) 
0.153*** 
(0.04) 
0.153*** 
(0.04) 
0.151*** 
(0.04) 
0.157*** 
(0.04) 
RTA/Creation 9.608*** 
(1.49) 
0.594*** 
(0.16) 
0.598*** 
(0.16) 
0.756*** 
(0.16) 
0.776*** 
(0.15) 
0.345 
(0.18) 
0.758*** 
(0.16) 
0.967 
(0.50) 
Log of RTA/Diversion -15.04*** 
(2.80) 
-16.09*** 
(2.81) 
-15.66*** 
(2.82) 
-16.68*** 
(2.81) 
-16.86*** 
(2.81) 
-16.33*** 
(2.80) 
-16.72*** 
(2.81) 
-16.78*** 
(2.81) 
RTA_Distance -1.010*** 
(0.17) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RTA_Border  
 
1.156*** 
(0.33) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RTA_Continent  
 
 
 
1.288*** 
(0.33) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RTA_Language  
 
 
 
 
 
0.415 
(0.37) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RTA_Religion  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0350 
(0.05) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RTA_Legal origin  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.082*** 
(0.26) 
 
 
 
 
RTA_Ex-colonizer  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.476 
(0.39) 
 
 
RTA_Developing  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.198 
(0.52) 
Constant -56.06*** 
(1.388) 
-56.46*** 
(1.408) 
-56.48*** 
(1.405) 
-56.24*** 
(1.420) 
-56.44*** 
(1.404) 
-57.10*** 
(1.411) 
-56.22*** 
(1.419) 
-56.45*** 
(1.420) 
Observations 3699 3736 3719 3719 3736 3736 3719 3736 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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continents. These proxies for transportation costs support the fact that the lower the 
transportation costs are (the closer the countries are located), the more the regional trade 
agreements boost trade between the members. 
 
In column (6) it is also found out that same legal origin plays important role in determining 
the influence of RTA on trade creation. The estimated coefficient of RTA/Creation is 
significantly lower than the estimate in Table 2, but the coefficient for common legal origin is 
highly significant and positive. However, this estimate is slightly lower than the estimates for 
proximity. This means that proximity of RTA members increases the trade creation of RTAs 
more than common legal origin.  The same is with the common language, common religion, 
common ex-colonizer, and both being developing countries, except none of these variables is 
significant. If these variables were significant, they would boost the trade creation between 
member countries. Except if both of the countries are developing countries, because the 
coefficient of this variable is negative. This is in line with the findings of Krueger (1999, 16), 
who underlined that regional trade agreements between two developing countries are less 
probable to improve welfare as  countries with alike technologies receive no gains from trade 
with each other. 
In general, the estimation results reveal that the influence of RTAs may be larger for countries 
that have considerably lower transaction costs and have common legal origin which is in line 
with the idea of natural trading partner explained in Chapter 3.5. 
It was also tested what kind of conclusion the eight interaction terms together as regressors 
give. Only three of the coefficients are statistically significant and not close to the values that 
were estimated separately. In addition the signs of the coefficients were not as expected. 
Because of most of the variables were not significant, the results are not reported more 
detailed. 
Thus  far,  I  have  examined  the  influence  of  different  characteristics  on  the  trade  creation  of  
RTAs. Next, I will examine the influence of the same characteristics on trade diversion. 
According to the idea of natural trading partners that the results of the trade creation 
characteristics support, the proximity reduces trade diversion from non-members. However, 
in the case of BIC-countries I  might have to question this because of the trend that regional 
trade agreements are nowadays established also with countries located geographically apart. 
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Table 5 below reports regression results of the influence of eight characteristics on trade 
diversion.  
 
Table 5 The Effect of Characteristics on Trade Diversion 
 
Table 5 reports the estimation results that involved eight interaction terms and the extra-bloc 
dummy variable. In all columns, an interaction term for each characteristic is added 
separately. In column (1) the coefficients of the variables are similar compared to the baseline 
regression in column (1) on Table (2). Surprisingly, the absolute value of the coefficient for 
the RTA/Diversion has changed remarkably, from -16 to -133. 
In column (1) an interaction term for distance is included. The estimated coefficient for this 
interaction term RTAD/Distance is positive and significant. The remarkably large estimated 
coefficient means that the further the RTA members are at distance, the larger the trade 
diversion between non-members and members is. In columns (2) and (3) when two other 
interaction terms related to transaction costs, common border, and the same continent are 
estimated, it is possible to find out that if member countries border each other the common 
border and common continent decrease trade diversion from the rest of the world. However, 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Distance Border Continent Language Religion Legal 
origin 
Ex-colonizer Developing 
Log of GDPi 1.090*** 
(0.04) 
1.087*** 
(0.04) 
1.085*** 
(0.04) 
1.086*** 
(0.04) 
1.087*** 
(0.04) 
1.086*** 
(0.04) 
1.087*** 
(0.04) 
1.089*** 
(0.04) 
Log of GDPj 0.834*** 
(0.03) 
0.824*** 
(0.03) 
0.825*** 
(0.03) 
0.826*** 
(0.03) 
0.827*** 
(0.03) 
0.828*** 
(0.03) 
0.827*** 
(0.03) 
0.825*** 
(0.03) 
Log of population i 0.435*** 
(0.07) 
0.442*** 
(0.07) 
0.446*** 
(0.07) 
0.443*** 
(0.07) 
0.439*** 
(0.07) 
0.445*** 
(0.07) 
0.440*** 
(0.07) 
0.443*** 
(0.07) 
Log of population j 0.151*** 
(0.04) 
0.155*** 
(0.04) 
0.150*** 
(0.04) 
0.151*** 
(0.04) 
0.154*** 
(0.04) 
0.155*** 
(0.04) 
0.152*** 
(0.04) 
0.155*** 
(0.04) 
RTA/Creation 0.746*** 
(0.15) 
0.794*** 
(0.15) 
0.832*** 
(0.15) 
0.816*** 
(0.15) 
0.792*** 
(0.15) 
0.776*** 
(0.15) 
0.813*** 
(0.15) 
0.794*** 
(0.15) 
Log of RTA/Diversion -132.8*** 
(37.55) 
-20.44*** 
(3.54) 
-19.72*** 
(3.61) 
-16.86*** 
(3.14) 
-18.97*** 
(3.25) 
-14.63*** 
(3.83) 
-15.31*** 
(3.15) 
-21.59*** 
(5.65) 
RTAD_Distance 13.02** 
(4.23) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RTAD_Border  
 
7.631 
(5.64) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RTAD_Continent  
 
 
 
5.167 
(5.54) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RTAD_Language  
 
 
 
 
 
-5.627 
(7.54) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RTAD_Religion  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.177 
(5.91) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RTAD_Legal origin  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-6.696 
(5.37) 
 
 
 
 
RTAD_Ex-colonizer  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-15.62* 
(7.56) 
 
 
RTAD_Developing  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.946 
(6.18) 
Constant 76.41* 
(37.60) 
-35.89*** 
(3.956) 
-36.59*** 
(4.014) 
-39.46*** 
(3.557) 
-37.32*** 
(3.714) 
-41.81*** 
(4.214) 
-40.99*** 
(3.566) 
-34.81*** 
(5.905) 
Observations 3699 3736 3719 3719 3736 3736 3719 3736 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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neither of these variables is significant. The findings of distance and two other interaction 
terms, common border and common continent, are conflicting and based on these results it is 
not possible to say whether geographical proximity contributes to increase or decrease trade 
diversion.   In  column  (5)  the  positive  coefficient  for  religion  also  indicates  that  a  common  
religion between member countries decreases trade diversion while an opposite finding is 
found for a common language in column (4). 
In columns (6)-(8), it is also found out that same legal origin, common ex-colonizer and both 
countries being developing countries play important role in determining the influence of RTA 
on trade diversion. However, none of the coefficients, except common ex-colonizer, is 
significant. Though the signs of the coefficients of common language and common legal 
origin have expected signs meaning that common language or legal origin contributes to raise 
trade diversion. This is opposed finding to that common language boosts trade creation in 
Table 4. This discrepancy is interesting and probably reflects the natural errors natural in the 
measurement of language proximity between member countries or the proxy for the trade 
diversion. However, also Lee and Shin (2005) had the same findings. Because of the non 
significant coefficients, the influence of these characteristics on trade diversion has to be 
taken  with  caution.  From  the  eight  variables  mentioned  in  this  paragraph,  the  common  ex-
colonizer has the greatest influence on trade diversion and both countries being developing 
countries the lowest.  
In general, the estimation results reveal that the influence of RTAs on trade diversion may be 
larger for the member - nonmember relationships where countries partly have and partly not 
similar cultural roots and are not close at distance, which is mostly in line with the idea of a 
natural trading partner explained in Chapter 3.5. This means that the trade diversion is more 
probable for the countries that are not natural trade partners. 
It was also tested what kind of conclusion the eight interaction terms together as regressors 
give. None of the coefficients are statistically significant and far away those that were 
estimated separately. Therefore the results are not reported more detailed. 
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7.4 The Impact of Characteristics on the RTAs of BIC-countries 
 
In this chapter, I will analyze what kind of influence the country characteristics have on the 
trade  creation  and  diversion  of  BIC’s  regional  trade  agreements.  The  empirical  results  of  
Chapter 7.3 revealed that the three characteristics of RTA members (geographical distance, 
common borders, and common continent) have significant impacts on trade creation. I found 
that RTAs among countries that are located close at distance, share a land border, or are 
located in the same continent tend to create more trade but less trade diversion. In the trade 
diversion none of the variables, except distance and common colonizer, was significant. This 
is why less attention is paid to analyze those variables in this chapter. In addition, some of the 
cultural variables had significant impacts on trade creation. 
Table 7 summarizes the eight characteristics of member countries for the existing regional 
trade agreements of the BIC-countries. The average distance between member pairs is the 
smallest for the regional trade agreement SAFTA (7.317), which is higher than the average 
distance of member pairs in all existing regional trade agreements (6.760).31 Overall, the 
average distance between the regional trade agreements of the BIC-countries is remarkably 
higher the average distance for RTA’s in general. The members of the bilateral agreements 
China-Chile (9.846), Chile-India (9.717) and China-New Zealand (9.234) have the highest 
average distances. 
Table 8 presents the trade creation estimates between the RTA-members of the BIC-countries. 
The variables in the table are constructed by combining three factors: 1) estimated coefficients 
on RTA/Creation of the gravity equation in column (1) of Table 4, 2) the estimated coefficient 
RTA/Creation_Distance and 3) the average distance of individual RTAs (Table 7). The 
estimated trade creation effects vary from -0.337 for bilateral agreement China-Chile to 2.214 
for bilateral agreement India-Bhutan in terms of log of bilateral trade. China-Macao was an 
exception having the trade creation effect of 9.608 meaning that distance plays a significant 
role in the trade creation between member countries, especially in the trade between China 
and Macao. 
In terms of other characteristics affecting transportation costs (common border and continent), 
there are few countries in total in the agreements that share a border or are located in the same 
                                               
31 See study of Lee and Shin (2005, 34) and their calculations for average distance of the members of all regional 
trade agreements as an approximate value. 
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continent. For this reason, the transportation costs among BIC-countries and their trading 
partners  are  on  average  higher  than  for  other  RTA-members.  This  on  the  other  hand  gives  
unfavorable situation for only creating trade among members and between members and non-
members, which supports the theory of Ornelas (2005b) that in addition to trade creation the 
main motivation in the RTAs is nowadays the political reasons, which is why the main 
priorities when establishing the agreements are not the low transportation costs or location of 
the member countries. This change in the landscape of regional trade agreements can be well 
seen in the case of these emerging economies. 
The estimates for trade diversion (considering variables affecting transportation costs only) 
are presented in the right side of Table 8. The variables are constructed based on the estimated 
coefficients on the RTA/Diversion and RTA/Diversion distance of the gravity equation in 
column (1) - (3) in Table 5 and the average distance, common border and common continent 
of  individual  RTAs.  It  was  found  out  that  all  the  RTAs  of  the  BIC-countries  were  located  
further of the average geographical distance which diverts trade away from non-members. 
The estimated (negative) trade diversion impacts were in all of the RTAs remarkably large, 
which is a consequence of the large estimate for trade diversion coefficient. This was found 
out and the reasons for this has already been discussed in Chapter 7.1. That is why the results 
related to trade diversion should be taken with caution. In addition, the estimated (negative) 
trade diversion impacts when considering common border and common continent were 
similar to distance; extremely large. 
None  of  the  regional  trade  agreements  of  the  BIC-countries  are  located  close  enough  to  be  
able to create trade among member countries and among members and non-members. This 
can be proved with the results of the Table 8. Though, the results for trade diversion variables 
were significantly large (negative), the sign of these variables supports the idea of natural 
trading partners. 
In addition to the transportation costs the interest in this thesis is in the cultural characteristics 
and their influence on trade creation and diversion. As the BIC-countries are culturally quite 
different compared to other countries, there are still few countries that have common 
language. Though, more countries have the same religion, common colonizer or their legal 
origin is the same. The variables to study the effect of cultural characteristics on trade creation 
and diversion are constructed as in the case of transportation costs. The estimated coefficient 
RTA/Creation of the gravity equation in column (1) in Table 4, the estimated coefficient for 
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RTA/Creation cultural variables and the average value of the cultural variables are combined. 
The estimated trade creation effects vary from 0.756 for most of the bilateral agreements not 
sharing the same language to 1.171 for the agreements between China-Hong Kong, China-
Macao, China-Singapore and India-Singapore. The influence of common religion for trade 
creation effects vary from 0.776 for most of the bilateral RTAs to 0.811 to Mercosur and 
China-Hong Kong, China-Macao, China-Singapore and India-Bhutan. The influence of 
common legal origin on trade creation varies from 0.345 for most of the bilateral agreements 
to 1.427 to Mercosur, SAFTA, India-Sri Lanka and India-Bhutan. The influence of common 
ex-colonizer varies from 0.758 for most of the bilateral agreements to 1.234 to India-Sri 
Lanka, India-Singapore and China-Macao. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that both 
transportation costs and cultural variables influence significantly on trade creation. Member 
countries that have similar country characteristics in the regional trade agreements seem to 
make the regional trade agreement trade creating. In the case of cultural variables affecting 
trade diversion, the same trend can be noticed as in the case of variables affecting 
transportation costs: the impact is remarkably large and negative. 
Last the influence of both countries being developing countries on trade creation varies from 
0.769 for most of the bilateral agreements to 0.967 for most of the bilateral agreements with 
China. Which means that if both of the countries are at the same level of development it is 
more probable that the establishment of the regional trade agreement increases trade among 
members. Though, the case of members and non-members the same level of development 
decreases trade diversion, which supports the idea, how certain characteristics influence on 
trade flows. 
The results show that the regional trade agreements of the BIC-countries seem to create trade 
with member countries, but also divert trade from non-members. During the time period 
2001-2008 the trade of the BIC-countries has increased 76 % according to the study as a 
consequence of the regional trade agreements. During the same period, the trade is diverted 
away  from  the  non-members  of  the  regional  trade  agreements.  It  was  found  that  possible  
reason for this trade diversion is that instead of dummy variable for trade diversion a 
Michaely index was used. The reason why trade diversion variable influences this way in the 
thesis is the relatively short time period compared to the studies where the index has 
performed more reliable results. The R-square (within) is around 59 % in the estimations, 
which means that the regression line fits its observations relatively well and the range of R-
square is in line with the previous studies. The influence on regional trade agreements on 
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trade was also tested by using IV-estimation. Though, the post-estimation test, Hausman test, 
predicted that there is no need to use IV-method as it is less efficient than OLS when four 
cultural variables (language, religion, ex-colonizer, legal origin) were used as instruments. 
Reason for this may be the fact that the instruments used do not totally fulfil the other 
requirement for a good instrument. Therefore, the IV-estimation was done by excluding the 
language from the instruments. In this case, the Hausman test revealed that IV-estimation 
should be preferred over OLS. Last, the estimation results reflect the fact that the role of the 
natural trading partners in the regional trade agreements of the BIC-countries is no longer as 
distinct as before. However, the characteristics that influence on trade creation are mostly in 
line  with  the  theory  of  natural  trade  partners  meaning  that  RTAs  among  countries  that  are  
located  close  at  distance,  share  a  land  border,  or  are  located  in  the  same continent  tends  to  
create more trade but less trade diversion. In addition, cultural variables had positive impacts 
on trade creation. However, the characteristics influencing on trade diversion do not support 
the theory as well. This is because of the extremely large and not significant absolute values. 
However, the signs of the variables are as the theory suggests.  
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8 Conclusions  
 
The aim in this thesis has been to study the influence of BIC’s regional trade agreements on 
the trade flows. In addition, in the thesis it was reviewed the previous research into which the 
results of the BIC-countries can be compared. Based on the results of the previous studies and 
this thesis it is clear that BIC’s regional trade agreements have significant impact on trade 
flows. The number of regional trade agreements has increased recent years remarkably despite 
the recent financial crisis 2008-2009. Despite the increased number of regional trade 
agreements  in  the  emerging  economies,  the  research  of  these  countries  has  not  become  
common. For example, before this study no empirical study has been made, where the country 
group, BIC, has been the target. 
The theoretical part concentrated on explaining the regional trade agreements’ trade effects. 
The main finding from the theoretical part was that the regional trade agreements should 
increase the trade of the member countries. In addition, both Ornelas’ (2005b) and Krishna’s 
(1998) theories were analyzed and it was concluded that the government’s role is essential in 
the establishment of the regional trade agreements. Above all, the determination of external 
tariffs has significant impact on the end result of the models. This means that if external 
tariffs are assumed to be endogenous, the regional trade agreement will benefit the whole 
world.  If  the external tariffs are determined to be exogenous,  the member countries will  not 
participate in the agreement without trade diversion in Krishna’s model. This is because of the 
lack of benefits the member countries will get from the agreement without trade diversion. As 
the expectations of the models are quite unambiguous, it was possible to test the findings 
empirically by using the data of Brazil, India and China. 
The research problems in the thesis were: 1) What is the influence of BIC-countries’ regional 
trade  agreements  on  trade  flows?  and  2)  Does  the  member  country  characteristics  have  
influence on trade creation and trade diversion? The results for the first research question 
reveal that the regional trade agreements have significant impact on trade flows among 
member countries. During the time period 2001-2008 the regional trade agreements increased 
the trade flows of the BIC-countries 76 percent. The first research question includes also the 
impact of the regional trade agreements on the trade flows between member and non-member 
countries. Though the increase in trade flows among the member countries is large, the results 
reveal that there is also large trade diversion. This implies that countries might have 
precautionary motives to establish RTAs and not just have overall welfare in their mind as 
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Krishna (1998) states. However, the results of second research question reveal that countries 
that have the same characteristics, as the natural trading partners, tend to form regional trade 
agreements that are trade creating. This means that countries that are located close at distance, 
share a border, have common language, and have the same legal origin certainly benefit from 
the regional trade agreements. Though, for the member countries that are not natural trading 
partners it is likely that they will face trade diversion as a consequence of the regional trade 
agreements that BICs establish. 
The empirical findings of this thesis strongly support the earlier findings. In other words, 
BIC’s regional trade agreements in its traditional form induce both trade creation and 
diversion. In the case of the emerging economies, the regional trade agreements have positive 
impact on trade which reflects the fact that trade liberalization is an excellent way to boost the 
trade in the BIC-countries as the theories of Ornelas (2005b) and Krishna (1998) also suggests 
for all the regional trade agreements. However, the regional trade agreements’ large impact on 
trade diversion partly supports the theories and reveals two facts. First, this causal relationship 
reveals that trade creation is no longer the main goal of the regional trade agreements as the 
theories of Ornelas (2005b) and Krishna (1998) also states. The reason is that the role of the 
special interest groups in the establishment of the RTAs has increased. Second, the large trade 
diversion supports Krishna’s (1998) theory. This is because Krishna determined the RTA and 
external tariffs exogenously fixed. In Krishna’s model the exogenously fixed external tariffs 
lead to trade diversion as a consequence of the agreement. Otherwise, the agreement will not 
be established. In addition, if Ornelas also kept external tariffs exogenously fixed, some trade 
diversion would have also resulted from his model (Ornelas 2005b, 484). However, the 
inconsistent results of the trade diversion may also reflect the relatively short time period, the 
increased number of bilateral trade agreements and above all the probably biased proxy for 
the trade diversion. That is why it is rational to be cautious when making conclusions about 
the trade diversion. 
The government’s role in the establishment process cannot be underestimated. The role of the 
government is obvious in the case of BIC-countries as China belongs to the largest economies 
in the world and obviously has political motivations in its activities. Ornelas’ (2005b) theory 
underlines the government’s role in the establishment process and states the overall trade 
creation impacts. In the model, the government’s decision power increases when the special 
interest groups lose the interest to influence the government and do not give any 
compensation any more. Krishna’s (1998) model reviews the topic from the different 
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viewpoint. In Krishna’s (1998) model, the special interest groups have large impact on 
government’s actions as the special interest groups will not support the agreement if it will be 
a zero-sum game. As a result, Krishna suggests that the trade diversion is the prerequisite for 
the regional trade agreement to be established. This is the case where the members of the 
agreements see the benefits from the agreements to come only if there is some trade diversion. 
In other words, if there is no trade diversion in Krishna’s (1998) model the governments do 
not see any benefits that they would get from the trade liberalization. 
The normal estimation does not take into the consideration the impact of certain 
characteristics of the partner countries on trade creation and diversion, which is why the 
characteristics of the countries were studied more precisely. When a closer look was taken to 
how certain characteristics influence the trade creation and diversion, it was found out that the 
natural trade partners as member countries tend to create more trade than the others and at the 
same time less trade diversion exists among natural trade partners. These results suggest that 
if the trade creation was the main goal of the regional trade agreements, the agreements 
should be established with the natural trading partners. Though, the reality may turn out to be 
different in some cases because of the government’s political motivations that are put in 
practice via bilateral agreements. 
When we take a look the possible trends that may occur in the trade liberalization in the near 
future, we should pay attention to the changing landscape of regional trade agreements, 
especially the increased number of bilateral agreements. In addition, regional trade 
agreements’ role may change, as many researchers have already found a positive relationship 
between discriminatory and nondiscriminatory trade liberalization. However, it may be quite 
challenging to predict how the role will change in the near future. I assume that the same 
trend in the establishment of the regional trade agreements continues, though the other 
underlying reasons may continue to change remarkably. More and more bilateral agreements 
are established, which reflects the increasing role of the government’s political motivations in 
the establishment process. As the landscape of the regional trade agreements continues to 
change, also new geographical areas will start to liberalize their trade. The countries in Africa, 
for  example,  have  already  made  a  plan  to  develop  their  regional  trade  area,  African  Union.  
African Union was established in 2002 to have in some point relatively similar features to 
European Union. (Haavisto, 2002.) Also the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) has 
84 
 
recently announced similar plans (BOFIT Weekly 2011)32. These plans also supports the 
theory of natural trading partners as the countries in Africa and CIS are located 
geographically close and are culturally quite similar. In addition, it can also be expected that 
from the emerging economies at least China will make RTA with the countries in Africa as 
China already has started to co-operate other ways with the countries in that continent.33 That 
on the other hand would suit perfectly on China’s trade liberalization strategy meaning 
bilateral agreement and long geographical distance without forgetting political motivations. 
To conclude with the study it was possible to perceive quite precisely the impact of the BIC-
countries’ regional trade agreements on the trade flows. On the other hand it was useful to get 
information about the reasons why trade creation or trade diversion exists. This information 
was got by identifying the characteristics of the member and non-member countries and 
analyzing which of the characteristics influence on trade creation, which on trade diversion. 
By studying this impact, it is possible to influence on the outcome of regional trade 
agreements and understand the outcome better. Recent years there have been discussions 
about the role of the regional trade agreements in the survival of the BIC-countries and rest of 
the world from the financial crisis in 2008-2009. Freytag and Voll (2009) proposed a solution 
for the countries to survive from the crisis by encouraging especially the emerging countries 
to continue to liberalize their trade as the countries have done. Also OECD (2009) suggested 
the same. However, it would be interesting to study if there is a real connection between the 
trade liberalization of the emerging economies and the survival from the crisis. Though, it is 
sure,  that  BIC-countries  will  continue  to  be  the  major  economic  powers  with  enormous  
growth rates in the future. Part of the emerging country group BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, 
China  and  South  Africa),  BIC-countries  have  planned  to  find  a  way  to  help  the  world  
economy in the present European debt crisis. They have planned to buy the Euro bonds to 
relieve the crisis which again reflects the fact that emerging economies certainly have an 
important role in the survival from the crisis. (BRICS in talks to buy Euro bonds to help ease 
crisis ----2011.) If not via trade liberalization, it is possible through other channels. Overall, 
there are many topics related to the trade liberalization of the emerging economies to study, 
those were not possible to study within this study and therefore should be studied in the near 
future. 
                                               
32 CIS-countries include 12 countries of which Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, 
Tajikistan and Ukraine have already signed the new free trade agreement (BOFIT Weekly 2011). 
33 E.g. China helps Nigeria, which is the largest oil producers in Africa, to develop its energy infrastructure. 
(BOFIT Weekly 2010) 
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APPENDIXES 
 
Appendix A 
Table 6 The Effects of Specific RTAs on Trade Flows 
 
+ p< 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p< 0.01, *** p< 0.001 
 
Coef. Std. Err. 
 GSTP 0.9992 0.34 ** 
GSTP to non member 0.2863 0.26 
 LAIA -0.5867 0.74 
LAIA to non member -0.8770 0.43 * 
PTN 0.5504 0.55 
PTN to non member -0.0747 0.31 
Mercosur -4.2729 6.76 
Mercosur to non member -2.4399 3.34 
Mercosur - India 6.8839 6.60 
Mercosur - India to non member 3.7418 3.32 
 APTA  -3.1183 1.17 ** 
APTA to non member -1.6603 0.76 * 
Chile - India 0.0631 2.02 
Chile - India to non member -0.4892 0.39 
India - Afghanistan -1.6712 1.52 
 India - Afghanistan to non member -1.8044 0.89 * 
India - Bhutan -1.9560 1.76 
India - Bhutan to non member -3.1264 1.01 ** 
India - Singapore 2.2183 5.05 
India - Singapore to non member 1.1931 2.67 
India - Sri Lanka 2.3468 1.91 
 India - Sri Lanka to non member 1.3346 1.07 
SAFTA  0.4757 0.96 
SAFTA to non member -0.5606 0.52 
ASEAN - China -0.0298 0.58 
ASEAN - China to non member -0.6566 0.33 * 
China - Chile 3.7107 2.02 + 
China - Chile to non member 0.8137 1.40 
 China - New Zealand 0.6648 1.49 
 China - New Zealand to non member 0.0565 0.86 
China - Singapore 1.0929 5.03 
China - Singapore to non member 1.2385 2.37 
China - Pakistan -2.6403 1.79 
China - Pakistan to non member -2.3688 1.01 * 
China - Hong Kong 4.0052 1.51 ** 
China - Hong Kong to non member 1.8982 0.86 * 
China - Macao (omitted) 
China - Macao to non member (omitted) 
Log of population i 2.3292 0.36 *** 
Log of population j 1.0589 0.03 *** 
Log of GDP i 1.0834 0.05 *** 
Log of GDP j 0.8612 0.03 *** 
Log of distance -0.9441 0.12 *** 
Constant -65.1536 7.07 *** 
Observations   4106 R-Sq    0,5488 
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Appendix B 
 
Table 7 The Characteristics of Regional Trade Agreements 
 
Note: The full name of the RTAs is as following: Protocol on Trade Negotiations (PTN), Asia 
Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA), Latin American Integration Association (LAIA), Global 
System  of  Trade  Preferences  among  Developing  Countries  (GSTP),  Southern  Common  
Market (MERCOSUR), South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA), Association of South 
East Asian Nations (ASEAN). 
The standard deviation is reported in parenthesis. Out of 19 RTAs, even 13 are bilateral 
RTAs.
RTAs Formation Countries Distance Continent Language Colonizer Religion Legal Origin Developing Border
PTN 1971 15 8.899 0.231 0 0 0.558 0.692 0.846 0.231
(std.err) 0.076 0.042 0 0 0.113 0.045 0.036 0.042
APTA 1975 6 7.929 0.400 0 0.200 0.300 0.300 0.900 0.400
(std.err) 0.056 0.055 0 0.045 0.052 0.052 0.034 0.055
LAIA 1980 12 8.141 0.636 0 0 0.319 0.909 1 0.636
(std.err) 0.047 0.052 0 0 0.114 0.031 0 0.052
GSTP 1988 44 8.908 0.098 0.134 0.159 0.198 0.402 0.939 0.098
(std.err) 0.026 0.012 0.013 0.014 0.022 0.019 0.009 0.012
MERCOSUR 1991 4 7.793 1 0 0 1 1 1 1
(std.err) 0.060 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
India-Sri Lanka 1998 2 7.448 0 0 1 0 1 1 0
(std.err) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
India-Afghanistan 2003 2 7.462 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
(std.err) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
China-Hong Kong 2003 2 7.385 1 1 0 1 0 1 0
(std.err) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
China-Macao 2003 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 1
(std.err) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MSUR-India 2004 5 8.879 0.400 0 0 0.4 0.4 1 0.4
(std.err) 0.103 0.055 0 0 0.055 0.055 0 0.055
SAFTA 2004 7 7.317 0.667 0.167 0.667 0.333 1 1 0.667
(std.err) 0.030 0.069 0.054 0.069 0.069 0 0 0.069
ASEAN-China 2004 11 8.360 0.200 0.2 0 0.5 0.4 0.9 0.3
(std.err) 0.063 0.045 0.05 0 0.06 0.055 0.034 0.052
India-Singapore 2005 2 8.318 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
(std.err) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
China-Chile 2005 2 9.846 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
(std.err) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Chile-India 2006 2 9.717 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
(std.err) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
India-Bhutan 2006 2 7.321 1 0 0 1 1 1 1
(std.err) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
China-Pakistan 2006 2 8.394 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
(std.err) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
China-New Zealand 2008 2 9.234 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(std.err) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
China-Singapore 2008 2 8.227 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
(std.err) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
All sample 4695 8.965 0.053 0.121 0.101 0.166 0.293 0.715 0.051
0.008 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.003
Appendix C 
Table 8 The Characteristics and Trade Creation and Diversion Effects of BIC-countries’ RTAs 
 
 
RTAs of the Trade Creation Effects Trade Diversion Effects
BIC-countries by considering by considering
Distance Border Continent Language Religion Legal Origin Colonizer Developing Distance Border Continent Language Religion Legal Origin Colonizer Developing
PTN 0.620 0.861 0.895 0.756 0.796 1.094 0.758 0.799 -16.931 -18.679 -18.528 -16.860 -16.083 -19.266 -15.310 -17.405
APTA 1.600 1.056 1.113 0.756 0.787 0.670 0.853 0.789 -29.565 -17.388 -17.653 -16.860 -17.417 -16.639 -18.434 -17.139
LAIA 1.385 1.330 1.418 0.756 0.787 1.329 0.758 0.769 -26.800 -15.584 -16.432 -16.860 -17.320 -20.717 -15.310 -16.644
GSTP 0.611 0.707 0.724 0.812 0.783 0.780 0.833 0.781 -16.822 -19.696 -19.216 -17.615 -17.944 -17.325 -17.786 -16.946
MERCOSUR 1.737 1.750 1.886 0.756 0.811 1.427 0.758 0.769 -31.329 -12.809 -14.553 -16.860 -13.793 -21.326 -15.310 -16.644
SAFTA 2.218 1.365 1.457 0.825 0.788 1.427 1.075 0.769 -37.539 -15.353 -16.275 -17.798 -17.244 -21.326 -25.723 -16.644
MSUR-India 0.640 1.056 1.113 0.756 0.790 0.778 0.758 0.769 -17.192 -17.388 -17.653 -16.860 -16.899 -17.308 -15.310 -16.644
ASEAN-China 1.165 0.941 0.856 0.839 0.794 0.778 0.758 0.789 -23.956 -18.151 -18.687 -17.985 -16.382 -17.308 -15.310 -17.139
ASEAN-India 1.381 0.710 0.727 0.839 0.776 0.778 0.948 0.789 -26.743 -19.677 -19.203 -17.985 -18.970 -17.308 -21.558 -17.139
India-Sri Lanka 2.085 0.594 0.598 0.756 0.776 1.427 1.234 0.769 -35.826 -20.440 -19.720 -16.860 -18.970 -21.326 -30.930 -16.644
India-Afghanistan 2.071 1.750 0.598 0.756 0.776 0.345 0.758 0.769 -35.640 -12.809 -19.720 -16.860 -18.970 -14.630 -15.310 -16.644
China-Hong Kong 2.149 0.594 1.886 1.171 0.811 0.345 0.758 0.769 -36.641 -20.440 -14.553 -22.487 -13.793 -14.630 -15.310 -16.644
China-Macao 9.608 1.750 1.886 1.171 0.811 0.345 1.234 0.967 -132.800 -12.809 -14.553 -22.487 -13.793 -14.630 -30.930 -21.590
India-Singapore 1.207 0.594 0.598 1.171 0.776 1.427 1.234 0.967 -24.498 -20.440 -19.720 -22.487 -18.970 -21.326 -30.930 -21.590
China-Chile -0.337 0.594 0.598 0.756 0.776 0.345 0.758 0.769 -4.604 -20.440 -19.720 -16.860 -18.970 -14.630 -15.310 -16.644
Chile-India -0.206 0.594 0.598 0.756 0.776 0.345 0.758 0.769 -6.284 -20.440 -19.720 -16.860 -18.970 -14.630 -15.310 -16.644
India-Bhutan 2.214 1.750 1.886 0.756 0.811 1.427 0.758 0.769 -37.478 -12.809 -14.553 -16.860 -13.793 -21.326 -15.310 -16.644
China-Pakistan 1.130 1.750 1.886 0.756 0.776 0.345 0.758 0.769 -23.511 -12.809 -14.553 -16.860 -18.970 -14.630 -15.310 -16.644
China-New Zealand 0.282 0.594 0.598 0.756 0.776 0.345 0.758 0.967 -12.571 -20.440 -19.720 -16.860 -18.970 -14.630 -15.310 -21.590
China-Singapore 1.298 0.594 0.598 1.171 0.811 0.345 0.758 0.967 -25.679 -20.440 -19.720 -22.487 -13.793 -14.630 -15.310 -21.590
Reference: The average of 0.554 0.659 0.666 0.807 0.782 0.661 0.806 0.825 -16.078 -20.009 -19.448 -17.556 -18.112 -16.583 -16.872 -18.045
all RTAs in BIC countries
Appendix D 
Table 9 The Country Table 
 
 
Afghanistan, Islamic Republic of Dominican Republic Lao People's Democratic Republic Saint Kitts and Nevis
Albania Ecuador Latvia Saint Lucia
Algeria Egypt Lebanon Saint Pierre and Miquelon
Angola El Salvador Lesotho Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
Antigua and Barbuda Equatorial Guinea Liberia Samoa
Argentina Eritrea Libya Sao Tome and Principe
Armenia Estonia Lithuania Saudi Arabia
Aruba Ethiopia Luxembourg Senegal
Australia Falkland Islands Macedonia, Former Yugoslav Republic Serbia, the Republic of
Austria Faroe Islands Madagascar Seychelles
Azerbaijan, Republic of Fiji Malawi Sierra Leone
Bahamas Finland Malaysia Singapore
Bahrain, Kingdom of France Maldives Slovak Republic
Bangladesh French Guiana Mali Slovakia
Barbados French Polynesia Malta Slovenia
Belarus Gabon Martinique Solomon Islands
Belgium Gambia Mauritania Somalia
Belize Georgia Mauritius South Africa
Benin Germany Mexico Spain
Bermuda Ghana Moldova, Republic of Sri Lanka
Bhutan Gibraltar Mongolia Sudan
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) Greece Morocco Suriname
Bosnia and Herzegovina Greenland Mozambique Swaziland
Botswana Grenada Myanmar Sweden
Brazil Guadeloupe Namibia Switzerland
Brunei Darussalam Guatemala Nauru Syrian Arab Republic
Bulgaria Guinea Nepal Tajikistan
Burkina Faso Guinea-Bissau Netherlands Tanzania, United Republic of
Burundi Guyana Netherlands Antilles Thailand
Cambodia Haiti New Caledonia Timor-Leste
Cameroon Honduras New Zealand Togo
Canada Hungary Nicaragua Tonga
Cape Verde Iceland Niger Trinidad and Tobago
Central African Republic India Nigeria Tunisia
Chad Indonesia Norway Turkey
Chile Iran, Islamic Republic of Oman Turkmenistan
China, People Republic: Hong Kong Iraq Pakistan Tuvalu
China, People Republic: Macao Ireland Palau Uganda
China, People Republic: Mainland Israel Panama Ukraine
Colombia Italy Papua New Guinea United Arab Emirates
Comoros Jamaica Paraguay United Kingdom
Congo, Republic of Japan Peru United States of America
Costa Rica Jordan Philippines Uruguay
Côte d'Ivoire Kazakhstan Poland Uzbekistan
Croatia Kenya Portugal Wallis and Futuna Islands
Cuba Kiribati Qatar Vanuatu
Cyprus Korea, Democratic People's Republic of Réunion Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of
Czech Republic Korea, Republic of Romania Vietnam
Denmark Kuwait Russian Federation Yemen, Republic of
Djibouti Kyrgyz Republic Rwanda Zambia
Dominica Kyrgyzstan Saint Helena Zimbabwe
